The Role of the AKP in the Process of Democratization in Turkey

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ABSTRACT
In the framework of the theoretical literature related to the transition and consolidation of democracy, this article seeks to analyze the mechanism of democracy and its possibilities in line with the new political developments in Turkey. The Republic of Turkey has experienced fragile and evolving experiences of democracy; Therefore, the main topic of the article is not the transition to democracy, as Turkey has been through the initial transition to democracy since the 1950s, but the process of consolidating and consolidating democracy in this country, because Turkey's shaky democracy has always been characterized by instability and fragility; Therefore, the author wants to answer the main question of which direction the political developments in Turkey are moving, given the victory of the Islamist party "Justice and Development", which many in Turkey consider a new stage in the country's democracy. On the other hand, this study intends to address the issue of the political developments in Turkey, given the Islamists entry into the realm of the power of the political system through the channel of democracy. And it seeks to confirm the main hypothesis that Turkish democracy is moving towards the stage of consolidation and consolidation, and macro-structural changes and the balance of power in the new Turkish political arena are the basis for the consolidation of this process.

Keywords: Turkey's political system; Development party; Republic of Turkey; Democracy

INTRODUCTION
True democracy today is not necessarily an ideal system, but a way of exercising sovereignty that can combine the two dimensions of political life, namely conflict and consensus; but democracy can only function properly when it has reached the stage of consolidation and consolidation. As Samuel Huntington puts it, the most important lesson in the history of democratization is that the difficulty of working is not only in ending the undemocratic regime, but also in establishing democratic institutions [1]. The Republic of Turkey experienced its first transition to democracy in the 1950s, during the victory of the opposition party over loyalists, and since then we have always witnessed democratic and competitive elections in Turkey. Huntington also believes that before a government can be considered democratic, the government must be changed at least twice through elections. Contrary to the Middle East tradition, in which elections do not change governments, but are the ones that interfere in elections, Turkey has passed this test not twice but many times. But the fundamental problem is that Turkish democracy has always faced a lack of consolidation. Democracy has always been characterized by instability and fragility in a prosperous Turkish society with chronic and long-term political and social conflicts; In fact, the political instability caused by party rivalries and social unrest, and successive military interventions due to the institution's high influence, have plunged Turkish democracy into a vicious cycle. However, these ups and downs in the process of Turkish democracy have been evolutionary in nature, and in recent decades we have seen an increase in political stability and the completion of democracy in Turkey [2]. The Turkish parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007 showed that Turkey had taken a significant step towards consolidating democracy and civilian rule, as demonstrated by the participation of the people in the context of the legitimacy of the AKP [3].
Now, the main question is where the political developments in Turkey are heading, given the victory of the Islamist Justice and Development Party, which many in Turkey consider a new stage in the country's democracy [4]. On the other hand, this study intends to address the issue of the political developments in Turkey, given the Islamists (Justice and Development Party)'s entry into the realm of the power of the political system through the channel of democracy. In this regard, other questions can be raised in the following contexts: Are the mechanisms of democracy in Turkey able to control the conflict between secularists and Islamists within the system? Given the socio-political situation in Turkey, is it possible to limit the process of democracy or the return of authoritarianism? Given Turkey's socio-political conditions, is it possible for radicalism and destructive tendencies to grow? In answer to these questions, the main hypothesis is presented [5].

**METHODOLOGY**

This paper will be analyzed based on descriptive analytical method and use of library resources.

**Theoretical foundations**

One of the most important and debated topics in the field of political sociology today is the issues of transition and the consolidation of democracy. The issues of democratization and related theories, in addition to their scientific value and theories, and their importance in expanding the field of comparative politics and political sociology, and will be useful and useful for political scientists and political sociologists, are also important for political activists. In the field of democratization, three categories of structuralist, activist, and multidimensional theories have sought to explain the transition to and consolidation of democracy; in this writing, theories of the third category have been used. Theories that are happy with a multidimensional view benefit from the advantages of previous theories and are far from their disadvantages. Optimal third-category theories are activist theories with structural macro-factors that attempt to combine macro-structural and structural variables with individual-centered and factor-centered variables. In the new theories, which are also supported by the present study, the political actions of actors are subject to macro-historical, social, economic and cultural structures, while theories that emphasize only political actions and each outcome depends on the will and interaction of actors. The elites see it as possible, they believe that macro-structures act as the context for political action, and they are very decisive in limiting or expanding the options available to activists. Historically constructed structures can act as threatening conditions; emphasizing the role of elites and activists, these theories argue that the certainty of the result cannot be predicted, and believe that many issues depend on the intelligence of the actors, each of which makes it possible to go back and there is no guarantee that the elite's abilities will change [6].

Indeed, the activist theories that merely shape the realm of political equations and actors neglect to examine the components that shape actors' capacities and preferences and transform them over time. If linking the strategic behavior of actors with situational and infrastructural requirements is a priority; Therefore, the bargaining of elites should be analyzed in terms of the concrete in which they are present and not in a vacuum, and this understanding will depend on the macro social, cultural and economic components and their connection with the behavior of elites. In these theories, the actions of political actors in the historical, social and economic context of society are analyzed. This approach explains how structural changes shape the possibility of transition and provides a more useful explanation of the political actions within these frameworks, and can show how the choices of political actors are subject to these macro-structures, defining and limiting them and placing special possibilities and constraints on actors [7].

It should be noted that this view is not a deterministic one, and that structures do not determine the choices of actors, but only the context in which events occur; In addition to giving an independent status to the field of politics, these theories believe that there is a reciprocal and reciprocal relationship between macro and structural factors with the field of micro and the field of politics. In this study, with the help of the theories of Juan Linz and Alfredo Stepan Saimimi, in explaining issues related to the process of democratization and consolidation in Turkey on the role of ruling elites "political elites, powerful groups, parties or components of the ruling class" in the context of historical, social structures. Emphasize cultural and institutionalism, as well as demonstrate the importance of a variety of elite structures and formulations and their relationship to the consolidation and consolidation of democracy.

**The republic of Turkey and the new political order**

To gain a correct understanding of socio-political issues and its current state and future of Turkish society today, we must look at the past and the political-historical situation and currents at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. In fact, the developments in the Ottoman period are so great that if there was no systematic cognition of this period, it would be impossible to understand the recent social and political issues in today's Turkey. Indeed, the changes of the late Ottoman period, known as the Age of Regulation, can be attributed to changes in the social structure of society and the formation of socio-cultural divisions, and dualities at all different levels ruled Turkish politics and society, leading to successive conflicts in general [8]. With the emergence of a new class of modern and Western-oriented elites and bureaucrats, along with the traditional structure of society and the Ottoman caliphate, the predecessors of the secular and Islamist tendencies in Turkey are forming today. They are clearly challenging each other between the political and social bodies of Turkey; According to these explanations, in this section we will deal with the socio-political context and context of the formation of the new Turkish political system.

**Socio-political context of the formation of the republic of Turkey:** In the late nineteenth century and on the eve of the twentieth century, while Western societies had made great progress and religious, moral, scientific and industrial revolutions in medieval life in Europe. It remained in the form of a closed society far from the changes of its surroundings, and
this contradiction eventually provided a wave of Western-style reform in society. The most characteristic manifestation of this movement should be considered in the issuance of the order of arrangements which in fact was the announcement of the wave of modernity and westernization and prepared the ground for the next political, social and cultural changes. At that time, Turkish society was witnessing the rise of two waves of change. The first wave of reforms arose from within the political system, which had a top-down trend. The reform program was led by men such as during this period, the issue of modernity and westernization had become a confusing and complex issue at the same time as other countries in the region, such as Iran. One group of reformists believed that one should step from head to toe and another group of reformers with pan-Islamist slogans to preserve rituals and principles. And Islamic culture, along with Western technology and science, believed that this second group in fact, had a tendency to synthesize Turk-Islam, and in general, it can be said that all currents of Turkish thought, whether Islamic or non-Islamic, have always had Turkic tendencies [9].

The new reform program created a decisive class that eventually shaped the Ottoman bureaucracy. This class of bureaucrats played an influential role in the internal developments of Turkish society and took over all modernist movements and formed a new political elite class known today in the public opinion of the Turkish people as the secular class; this group, along with intellectuals and the military, opposed the monopoly of religious aristocracy over social life. The roots of the formation of the Young Turk movement date back to 1860 and 1870. When the first young Turkish intellectuals went to Western Europe to study, they formed small groups in France.

New values and institutions: The emergence of Ataturk, which was the product of social changes and trends of the late Ottoman period, was immediately followed by the establishment of a new political system by modernists and progress in all aspects. The new political system seeks to organize and structure the new institutions of society in a new way by presenting and promoting values, or, in the words of Samuel Huntington, to establish a new political order by defining new social commonalities. After World War I and the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, Turkey chose Western Europe as a model for its new structure based on secularism. In order to compensate for its shortcomings in meeting EU standards, Turkey has taken the necessary steps to advance the so-called Harmonized Package, which consists of a set of amendments in the areas of the Penal Code, the Law on Associations, and the Law on Political Parties. These changes were within the framework of the authoritarian modern model. According to this model, changing the unfavorable dimensions of society through the establishment of a powerful centralized government is possible by implementing reform programs by the government machine to eliminate the undesirable dimensions of society [10].

Of course, it should be noted that during the formation of the republic, according to the strong and ancient tradition of statehood, the masses were deprived of any sense of national awareness and participation in affairs, and this was an important obstacle to establishing and institutionalizing a government; In fact, it seemed that the forces of change suddenly appeared in Anatolia and made great changes; Ataturk also tried to advance his reforms within the oligarchy of the military, bureaucrats and urban elites. Ataturk's actions in drastic and radical changes in social, cultural, legal structures, etc. were to such an extent that they even surprised Europeans.

However, the policy of Ataturk and his co-thinkers today seems very extreme and ambitious, these actions should be considered in their historical context, the beginning of the twentieth century, when various ideologies had raised many promises and hopes. The dominance of the idea of Western modernity, especially in the early stages of the establishment of the republic, was so strong and all-encompassing that one could hardly regard it as a particular intellectual condition, as no ideological challenge was posed by various views. To build a new socio-political system. Kemalism developed as a doctrine in the mid-1930s and was subsequently adopted into the official Republican ideological framework and in the form of the six fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic at the 1936 congress of the people's Republican Party [11].

Elite and socio-political actors: Although Turkey definitely has an electoral democracy, it lacks many of the characteristics of a liberal democracy. In general, Turkey's domestic politics should be analyzed in terms of the interaction of the three major socio-political forces, namely the left, the right, and the Islamist. The constituent components of these actors and socio-political forces can be considered in three important variables: nationality, religion and Western modernity. The third variable, Western modernity, although specifically introduced to Turkish political and social life in the mid-nineteenth and regulatory eras, as we have already mentioned, plays, along with two other variables, capacity and an important role in the internal developments of Turkish society and politics. In this section, we examine three socio-political forces active in Turkish politics and society. Although the presence and role of the army in the political arena is a tradition that exists in most of the third world countries, the role and position of the army in the Turkish society has a special and different character. Although military influence and involvement in political decision-making has been an integral part of Turkey's political life, the Turkish military's position in Turkey is contrary to the Third World model, as the Turkish military has a long-term legacy of Turkish political and historical culture and ideals. And special benefits are followed [12].

The presence of the army in Turkey has always been considered as the guardian and protector of Kian and the national interests of the country. The political independence of the military and the dazzling power behind it are trans-structural and even charismatic. Maintaining the political unity of the country in the face of socio-political divisions has always been part of the national interests claimed by the army and justifies the independent nature of the army. Turkish public opinion also sees the Turkish military as a guarantor of unity, territorial integrity, republicanism and secularism; This role of the military has been further strengthened by the quasi-perpetual political instability and the conflict between left-wing, right-wing and Islamist parties.
Democracy model in Turkey

In the Turkish political system, mechanisms and arrangements have been established for the establishment and development of a model of government and government interaction with society, by which the process of democracy and its acceleration is managed and controlled; In fact, the model of democracy in Turkey is a model of advancing democracy from top to bottom; Thus, democracy always faces special challenges and opposition from opposition forces, and the possibility of a return to authoritarianism is always as great as the consolidation of democracy. In his typology of democratization. According to typology, the process of democratization in Turkey is managed and controlled by the government from above, and the government has been able to manage the absorption of political participation and the integration of different social groups in the long run through an institutional mechanism. Management and support for democratization can take two forms: leaders and central elites actively participate in the hope of guiding and limiting the democratization process or preventing more undesirable change. The period of the establishment of the Republic in Turkey was a period of divergence and formation of a new political community that tried to change the values, structures and political behavior of the society in order to establish a new military from above and under the support of an elite group. As Sterling points out, the government knew that most Turks did not want to reform, and that some of their actions were deliberately designed as propaganda for the masses. Most Turks who lived in rural areas during this period could not digest Kemalism as an ideology; As one component of the ideology of Kemalism, the attitude towards Turkey as a Western country was not understood by the people. In fact, the new Western culture, the hallmarks of the capital's upper class bourgeoisie, remained shiny and thin, and did not affect society at all, creating a gap between government and people under government. This gap continued to grow throughout the 1930s.

On the other hand, the convergence phase was an attempt to expand the internal boundaries of the political system; In fact, the process of convergence and integration is such that political parties, by attracting the participation of the people the expansion and influence of state power, provide legitimacy from below and are on the side of the people. While the elite is still in charge of the mission of the Republic from above, even if one government represents the people and one government maintains the political system, on the other hand, they coexist and work together. Turkey's transition to democratic politics, the concern that political activists must be both loyal to the government and able to gain the support of large sections of the population, led to the widespread participation of right-wing right-wingers in government who were more likely to use persuasive skills and manipulate public opinion.

Social changes are macro-structural factors

From the 1980s, with the beginning of the so-called era of ossalism and the establishment of a liberal atmosphere in Turkish society and politics, the ground was prepared for profound changes in social and cultural foundations and structures. These structural changes in this study are considered as macro variables that have formed new equations and changes in the formulation of power as a social context and have shaped the context for political actions and conflicts within their field of politics. They are formed and designed based on resources and possibilities that are rooted in social relations and structures. The social developments in Turkey in the last few decades have led to the reduction of social divisions, and with the peacefulization of social divisions, the ground has been prepared for the accumulation of divergent interests of socio-political currents and forces. The Turkish socio-cultural organization moved towards greater social stability by weakening the divergent tendencies, especially at the two ends of the Islamic divide (secularism); and the Turkish fascists created the space for a liberal and conservative policy to flourish.

Sociological characteristics of Islam in Turkey: Islam in Turkey has different faces and mixed with its own cultural characteristics. For many, the question is, "Why have Islamic movements in Turkey not been as powerful as in other Islamic countries?" In response, it should be said that this is largely due to the nature of Islam in Turkey. Many call this type of Islam European Islam, that is, Islam with alcohol, gambling, etc., and in general, simple Islam. In general, Islam in Turkey has three different forms of Islam in Arab, African and even Iran and Pakistan. Islamic currents in Turkey are also largely intertwined with the element of nationality. Islam in this country has always had different and inhomogeneous dimensions; one of these aspects is sectarianism and collectivism, which constitute the main structure of the Turkish Muslim community. In order to study Islam more deeply in Turkish society, it is necessary to pay attention to these currents and different interpretations of Islam among these sects. From the very beginning, radical Islam in Turkey was characterized by the activities of great mystics and Sufis, such as Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi and Haj Bektash Veli, and this atmosphere of Islam still prevails in Turkey. The spirit of tolerance and tolerance that exists in the political-religious culture of the Turks is partly rooted in these thoughts. Also, another structural and sociological feature of Islam in Turkey is the class of ulema and centralized religious leadership, and this is a religious organization that is in charge of leading the religious affairs of the Turkish Muslim community.

Ozalism and the weakening of extremist Kemalism: The 1980 coup was, in fact, the death knell of extremist Kemalism with the content of atheistic laicism. The various experiences of the political system over nearly five decades and the successive crises and upheavals have subverted the optimistic optimism and aspirations of revolutionary and radical Kemalism. The strong tradition of statehood had created the illusion among some of the Turkish elite that society could be engineered arbitrarily, relying on limited resources. But the current socio-cultural realities of Turkey show other angles of the Turkish social strata that were not in line with the aspirations of the Kemalist elites. Modernization has not been able to eradicate the manifestations of traditional culture and eradicate religion. Liberal values were accepted only by a small percentage of the people and in general the society was not so westernized; in such an atmosphere, the official ideology was so challenged that in 1991. This section deals with these socio-structural changes that Turkish society has witnessed in recent decades; these challenges and crises have led
Turkish elites to become more realistic so that they can come up with new formulas to meet the new needs of society. Ozalism can be seen as the product of Turkey's entry into a new era in the 1980s. The rise of the New Right in the international arena, the crises of recent decades, and the emergence of threats such as Kurdish nationalism, Islamic radicalism, and, most importantly, the rise of Marxist tendencies in society, necessitated a revision of extremist Kemalism, but it was no easy task. Because Turkish society at that time was a multi-ethnic society. Marxists, nationalists, Islamists and Kemalists formed the axes of conflict in the early 1980s.

The growth of Islamism in the field of society: Turkish society during the 1980s, with the opening of cultural and social space, has witnessed an increase in Islamic tendencies in society. By adopting Özal's liberal policies and the growth of civil and social institutions naturally, the ground was prepared for the growth and expansion of Islamists’ activities in the cultural and social fields. According to Taylor, what the Kemalist elites were unable to comprehend was the fact that in Turkey Islam was more than just a political doctrine. Islam is an institutional and cultural framework that is present in all aspects of relations between members of society. In fact, most of these tendencies are not in opposition to secularism and modernity, but in fact part of the general trend of growth of identity-seeking currents at the international level, especially in Third World countries, because Islam is one of the constituent components of its cultural and social context. The country is considered and many misunderstandings created in this case arise from the lack of attention of the Kemalist elite to this basic fact. By identifying three factors, John Esposito and John Wall define a framework for understanding Islamist movements. These three factors are:

- Are these movements legitimate or illegal?
- To what extent have these movements been characterized by revolutionary and oppositional activism against established systems, and to what extent do they want to cooperate with the government?
- What is the approach of the political leaders ruling the movements?

By using this framework, they identify two main patterns for the main movements, one is the pattern of power and the second is the pattern of participation in power with the established regime; In this model, in which the Islamist current of Turkey can be analyzed, the movement has a legal status and moves within the framework of political competition within the political system, and the political approach of its leaders is a democratic and pragmatic rather than ideological approach. In fact, the Islamic tendencies in Turkey should not be ignored, because, as we have mentioned, the political and cultural atmosphere in this country is much different from the countries in which the Islamist movement plays a dominant role. The mistake that some people make in understanding Islamist tendencies is that they treat Islamic currents as a separate, independent group that is separate and independent from their surroundings and acts as a single, pervasive ideology. But this way of studying is a big methodological problem. A generation that includes thinkers, corporate owners, and independent individuals; In fact, the majority of Islamist forces operating in the form of various Islamic parties are bureaucrats, lawyers, engineers, journalists, doctors, and teachers, who are from the educated urban class, most of whom came from Muslim families in remote cities and villages in Turkey.

The growth and development of civil society: The state-dominated state and bureaucracy had hindered the growth and strengthening of civil society in Turkey before the 1980s. The Turkish political system since the 1980s has sought to provide opportunities for the growth and development of civil society in order to organize the various interests of society in the form of civil and popular institutions and to prevent political competition and pluralism from accumulating demands and concentrating hidden ideas; In this atmosphere, the Muslim sections of the society were able to open new horizons in the fields of economy, culture, media and various institutions, which in turn was effective in the field of Islamist tendencies of sections of Turkish society. Turkey witnessed the growth of capitalists in major European cities, including Istanbul and Izmir. In these areas, we also see the emergence of Muslim capitalists. In this regard, the smaller and pious Anatolian capitalists of the eastern regions of Turkey established the Association of Independent Turkish Traders or the Mossad; The association was in fact a Muslim economic activist and capitalist who emerged from the traditional body of Turkish society. Communities and sects are the basis of these investments, which in Turkey were called green or Islamic capital, and large companies and their investors were called Anatolian tigers.

Expansion and deepening of secularism in society: A look at the current situation in Turkey shows that the trend of modernity and laicism in society and the dominance of Western culture in the history of laicism in Turkey has never been faster than in recent decades. According to Professor Rumi, in the last twenty years, Turkey has experienced serious changes. 70% of the population and 30% of the villagers are Turkish. Today, even in rural areas of Turkey, most homes have satellite dishes, and these developments, along with other social developments that we have mentioned, have led to the expansion and deepening of secularism. With the establishment of the republican regime, the process of cultural change in the direction of Western civilization and complete severance from the Ottoman past was followed with speed and growth, and fundamental changes took place in all social and cultural affairs. The consequences of these profound socio-cultural developments must be sought today after more than 85 years in the present generation of Turkey, a generation that has lost touch with its past due to the profound change of language and script.

Given the importance of the leaders of modern Turkey, relying on the vast education system of Turkey and, in addition, the control of religious affairs by the Religious Organization, they have been able to have profound and effective effects on the culture of Turkish society. Although Turkish society has witnessed and will continue to experience many tensions and crises in this direction, it must be acknowledged that today's Turkish society has undergone profound changes in which secularism has been institutionalized and the process of
maneuverability and bargaining power of extremist laymen and Turkey. It should also be noted that, of course, the Turkish secularism and Islam can be said to be integrated. As pointed out in the theoretical discussions of the research, different possibilities and limitations for different political bargaining and political conflicts are not formed in a expedient tendencies of the general public, and clearly a clearly groundwork has been laid for the strengthening and closeness of contradiction between secularism and Islam. Turkey has Political developments and changes in the balance of power

As pointed out in the theoretical discussions of the research, political bargaining and political conflicts are not formed in a vacuum, but require a stable context. In fact, macro-social transformations act as a framework that shapes resources, possibilities. With the decline of social divisions, the groundwork has been laid for the strengthening and closeness of moderate tendencies, as well as the weakening of radical currents. In particular, these developments reduced the maneuverability and bargaining power of extremist laymen and the military. In general, developments within society have different possibilities and limitations for different political actors, which have led to the formation of a new formulation in politics, and in this context we will see how the bargaining and actions of political actors in the path of consensus, as much as possible around democratic rules and consolidation. Democracy is progressing.

New formulation in the field of power: The experience of party and the development of liberal and right-wing tendencies during the period of its rule in the 1980s accelerated the process of democratization and expanded the participation of people and powerful civil institutions in the political arena. From this point on, as we have seen, with the crises created by the official ideology, we see the failure of the monopoly elites' monopoly on the tools of power, so that extremist Kemalism could not meet the new needs of society. The process of changes in social and economic infrastructure formed new realities in society that provided the ground for changing the equations of power and the growth of transformational currents, and the change in the balance of power in society also changed the balance of power in politics; In fact, as we discussed in the previous chapter, the process of social and structural change has shifted in the direction we have seen, especially the gap between Islam and secularism. And in this environment conducive to growth, the policy of moderation and moderation brought the liberal currents and the moderate Islamists closer together, and as a result, political activists who did not conform to this social context became weak and isolated.

On the one hand, the rift between Islamist currents and parties must survive both the secular framework of the political system and the non-radical and expedient tendencies of the Muslim and traditional strata of society, which have been further strengthened by the existence of sects. Islamist has given. In this atmosphere, radical Islamic tendencies were weakened and isolated due to their roots in society, and due to the peaceful social divide, Islamist parties that represent part of the recent developments in Turkish society are ultimately seeking legal, cultural and social restoration of the Muslim strata of Turkish society. They see competition within the framework of democracy and the political system as the only possible and desirable way; In addition, the political system seeks to integrate Islamists into the political system. Indeed, Turkish political elites have realized that consolidating democracy in Turkey is not possible without considering the element of Islam in Turkish society, as we will discuss in more detail later in this chapter. The political system, in its general sense, has shown considerable ability to manage and control the democratic process.

At the other end of the spectrum is the expansion of the process of democratic and civic participation, as well as the organization of various tendencies and currents within Turkish society, along with the widespread popularity of democratic literature among elites and politicians in recent decades and the growth of liberal currents. In fact, although extremist Kemalists have an uncompromising spirit, they have influence in the strategic and powerful institutions of the political system, including the army, the National Security Council, the Constitutional Court, etc., but they have gradually realized that Turkey's democratic developments cannot be reversed. In this process, it is neither possible nor desirable for anyone; Therefore, only by controlling the process of democratization can the speed of these developments be slower and more attractive for the political system, and in fact, new realities in Turkish society have put these ideas in a position of weakness and passivity, bringing secular liberal, democratic and Islamist forces closer together. As noted, these developments transformed the equations of power in Turkish politics and, consequently activism.

1999 parliamentary elections and the fall of the Islamists: The 1999 parliamentary elections, which took place after the elections and the victory of the Islamist Welfare Party in 1996 and the events that followed, and the fall of the Erbakan government and the dissolution of the Welfare Party, were very important; In this election, the Virtue Party, which was founded shortly before the dissolution of the Welfare Party, was in fact the representative of the Islamist current and the successor to the Welfare Party; This time, however, the Islamists' vote fell to 15 percent from the Welfare Party's 21 percent. The Virtue Party, founded in 1997 as the successor to the Welfare Party, has been embroiled in internal divisions since losing its seat in the 1999 elections; The first general congress of the Virtue Party was held in Ankara shortly after the 1999 elections in a heated atmosphere and in a close and intense competition between the modernist faction and traditionalist faction of the party in Ankara. The emergence of the justice and development party and the advancement of democracy: As we have mentioned, in society principle, in the Turkish political space, new parties and voices that can reflect and represent the real issues of society are welcomed by the public and unlike parties that cannot respond to people's trust. Very soon, they will lose their place. In fact, the social base of the parties in Turkey is constantly changing and moving towards other currents, and this situation is especially
noticeable among the center-right and Islamist parties, which are inclined to modernist parties due to the political conditions of the election period. However, the situation in the Turkish left is more organized. In recent decades, secular parties and groups have always faced internal challenges and have caused a kind of instability in the political and economic spheres. In general, political and social conditions, economic prosperity, cross-sectional or chronic crises, etc. are factors that affect the attention of public opinion to one group or the loss of trust from another group.

In such circumstances, testing the position and experience of governing other parties, the emergence of the Justice and Development Party, and the lack of a negative record of party leaders in the eyes of the public were important and influential factors in the success of public opinion towards this Islamist party. The experience of the extremists of the Welfare Party, as well as the inefficiencies of other parties, drew the attention of the people to the moderate parties. The slogans and goals of the Justice and Development Party in various fields were also a good sign of moderation and respect for the rights of the people and a codified program to solve internal problems and difficulties. By presenting moderate and revolutionary figures, the AKP was able to take advantage of the differences between other groups and the general public, Islamist and even secular intellectual groups, and ethnic groups and other sections involved and influential in Turkish society. Accurate knowledge of the realities and developments of society became a pervasive discourse and was able to end the eleven years of the formation of the coalition government in this country. Since the fall of the Mam Ozal party in 1991, no party has won an absolute majority, and there has always been a government of left and right parties, which has led to differences in party stability and economic hardship.

The correct recognition of this party regarding the main needs of the society in the naming of this party is also evident; The Justice and Development Party was able to represent these developments in the political arena by accurately recognizing the evolution of society and the real demands of the Turkish public and even Muslims. However, extremist secularists are skeptical of the party, as well as of Turkey’s democratic developments, and although these ideas are present in the sensitive institutions of the political system, they are unable to counter them. Also, army generals are in a situation where they cannot plan logically and realistically, and although being in this position of weakness and passivity is unacceptable to them, the new formulation is in the field of coercive and real power and has reduced the maneuvering power of the army. In fact, as social and political relations have become more complex and political actors have grown, the role of the military has become more professional, paving the way for military intervention in politics. While positively assessing the victory of the justice and development party, the European Union has stated that, given its goals, slogans and programs, we hope to see fundamental changes in the field of human rights, democracy and freedom in this country. The Turkish military also does not want to harm its popular position, which it pays close attention to. Therefore, in the face of the people’s vote, passivity is the practice. Opposition groups called for a boycott of the election, but sought to justify military action, saying "this is a clear violation of our right to freedom of expression and association".

Given that the AKP was a new and emerging party in the field of Turkish politics, but due to its accurate knowledge of the changes in Turkish society in one period of its government, it was able to take great steps towards the growth and development of Turkey. At the beginning of the party’s rise to power, many secular extremist circles tried to introduce the party to society in the pursuit of prosperity. But the policies of the party’s young leaders and the party’s moderate policy, and the representation of various sections of society, nullified these beliefs, and efficiency became the weak point of the left and right parties in the country’s management. And the party’s economic achievements, such as reducing inflation by approximately three digits to less than 7 percent, increasing Turkey’s monetary power, increasing exports and increasing tourist attraction, led to more people turning to the Justice and Development Party in the 2007 elections.

CONCLUSION

Conflicts in politics are over, but democracy can be a framework for instrumental coordination to resolve these conflicts. In Turkey, political tensions and disputes will continue, but an in-depth analysis of the current situation in Turkey shows that Turkey's political and social developments are moving in the direction that consensus on democracy and consolidation of its rules is the most desirable path for all political actors. Turkey has half a century of democratic experience, and this experience, despite the role of the army’s al-Khattab chapter, has played an important role in maintaining the rules of the game, such as pluralism and the rotation of power. The process of democracy in Turkey has always been fraught with divisions, and democratic institutions have not been able to fully cover political conflicts, so Turkey's political climate has been fraught with successive instabilities and tensions. But the highlight is that every time the country's train deviates from the line of democracy, the train is not returned to its line; In general, it can be said that these ups and downs were evolutionary in nature, and that Turkish democracy was gradually moving towards consolidation and consolidation. On this basis, we can understand the sensitive role and position of the Justice and Development Party in consolidating democracy.

The concept of the ummah to citizenship, the creation of new economic opportunities and the development of critical thinking in a new educational system "It should be noted that it is true that the Turks largely followed foreign patterns, but they had their own experience of democracy. It has been society that has dynamized the dynamics of Turkey's democracy, not the external force; undoubtedly, this has increased the possibility of conflict between these institutions in Turkey. Research has shown that the re-joining of Islam to Turkey's secularist political process as a function of the process of consultative democracy is a matter of practice. With the presence of the Welfare Party in the government in 1996 and subsequent military coups in 1997, the focus was on Islamic culture and political demands in Turkey, that is, the characteristics of Basiji's practices and methods were re-examined to show how these various social
processes took place. From this perspective, democracy is a mechanism that functions to maintain political stability and the dynamism of the political system through conflict resolution through the attraction and integration of emerging groups and new demands. It seems that the ups and downs of Turkish democracy confirm the fact that democracy is a medicine that should be prescribed in small doses and can only be increased over time. Democracy is a drug whose overdose or sudden prescription can lead to the death of the patient. Many Turkish political elites have always argued that accelerating democracy and expanding political participation and extremism reduce the political system’s ability to scrutinize issues, and that Turkey’s political system seems to have the capacity to control and control chronic political conflicts within the framework.

Democracy shows that, as we see in the merger of Islamist forces, the AKP today is the result of decades of ups and downs of Islamist currents, which in every turn have reduced their burden for a style and finally integrated into the new political life of Turkey; Secular currents, parties, and institutions that uphold the principles of secularism have also come to understand that in a democratic order, identifiable groups with strong roots in society cannot be eliminated. As pointed out in the theoretical foundations of this article, the consolidation of democracy is fundamentally a transformation from above and the result of the actions and reactions of the ruling elites and the formation of the ruling constituent groups. This research is in the spotlight; In fact, the consolidation and consolidation of democracy depends on macro-level and micro-level conditions, and accordingly, the structural and macro-developments that took place in Turkey formed a clear social context for the action of political activists within power. In order for these favorable structural conditions to be politically effective to consolidate democracy, these conditions must be understood and exploited. Vali Reza Nasr believes that both the Islamists and the secularists agreed on democracy in practice and the context of political action. In fact, the change in the theoretical attitude of the actors involved in Turkey comes from the context of political action, and not the other way around. In Turkey, the political tradition of pragmatism has been established among all political currents. Turkey's extremist militias and secularists, although they have not accepted the serious involvement of Islamists in power and democratic values, in the new circumstances, neither side can alone pursue its own interests. Political actors plan their conflicts within the framework of democracy, and this means consolidating and consolidating democracy; thus, the growth of political Islam in Turkey is not recognized in order to disrupt the secular order in Turkey, and it is seen as a copy for the halfway point of social discord.

REFERENCES