The philosophy of AI may be a branch of the philosophy of technology that explores AI and its implications for knowledge and understanding of intelligence, ethics, consciousness, epistemology, and discretion. Furthermore, the technology cares with the creation of artificial animals or artificial people (or, at least, artificial creatures; see artificial life) therefore the discipline is of considerable interest to philosophers. These factors contributed to the emergence of the philosophy of AI. Some scholars argue that the AI community's dismissal of philosophy is detrimental. The philosophy of AI attempts to answer such questions as follows:

- Can a machine act intelligently? Can it solve any problem that an individual would solve by thinking?
- Are human intelligence and machine intelligence the same? Is the human brain essentially a computer?
- Can a machine have a mind, mental states, and consciousness within the same sense that a person's being can? Can it feel how things are?

**CAN A MACHINE HAVE A MIND, CONSCIOUSNESS AND MENTAL STATES?**

This is a philosophical question, associated with the matter of other minds and therefore the hard problem of consciousness. The question revolves around an edge defined by John Searle as "strong AI";

Searle introduced the terms to isolate strong AI from weak AI so he could specialise in what he thought was the more interesting and debatable issue. He argued that albeit we assume that we had a computer virus that acted exactly sort of a human mind, there would still be a difficult philosophical question that needed to be answered.

Neither of Searle's two positions is of great concern to AI research, since they are doing indirectly answer the question "can a machine display general intelligence?" (Unless it also can be shown that consciousness is important for intelligence). Turing wrote "I don't wish to offer the impression that i feel there's no mystery about consciousness but I don't think these mysteries necessarily got to be solved before we will answer the question of whether machines can think." Russell and Norvig agree: "Most AI researchers take the weak AI hypothesis without any consideration, and do not care about the strong AI hypothesis."

Before we will answer this question, we must be clear what we mean by "minds", "mental states" and "consciousness".

**CONSCIOUSNESS, MINDS, MENTAL STATES, MEANING**

The words "mind" and "consciousness" are employed by different communities in several ways. Some new age thinkers, for instance, use the word "consciousness" to explain something almost like Bergson's "élan vital": an invisible, energetic fluid that permeates life and particularly the mind. Science fiction writers use the word to explain some essential property that creates us human: a machine or alien that's "conscious" are going to be presented as a totally human character, with intelligence, desires, will, insight, pride then on. For others, the words "mind" or "consciousness" are used as a sort of secular synonym for the soul.

For philosophers, neuroscientists and cognitive scientists, the words are utilized in how that's both more precise and more mundane: they ask the familiar, everyday experience of getting a "thought in your head", sort of a perception, a dream, an intention or an idea, and to the way we all know something, or mean something or understand something. "It's not hard to supply a commonsense definition of consciousness" observes philosopher John Searle. What is mysterious and interesting isn't such a lot what it's but how it is: how does a lump of adipose tissue and electricity produce to the present (familiar) experience of perceiving, meaning or thinking?
Philosophers call this the hard problem of consciousness. It is the newest version of a classic problem within the philosophy of mind called the "mind-body problem." A related problem is that the problem of meaning or understanding (which philosophers call "intentionality"): what's the connection between our thoughts and what we are brooding about (i.e. objects and situations out in the world)? A third issue is that the problem of experience (or "phenomenology"): If two people see an equivalent thing, do they need an equivalent experience? Or are there things "inside their head" (called "qualia") which will vary from person to person?

Neurobiologists believe of these problems are going to be solved as we start to spot the neural correlates of consciousness: the particular relationship between the machinery in our heads and its collective properties; like the mind, experience and understanding. Some of the harshest critics of AI agree that the brain is simply a machine, which consciousness and intelligence are the results of physical processes within the brain. The difficult philosophical question is this: can a computer virus, running on a digital machine that shuffles the binary digits of zero and one, duplicate the power of the neurons to make minds, with mental states (like understanding or perceiving), and ultimately, the experience of consciousness?