

A Study of the Operational Oversight of Counter-Piracy Stakeholders in Indian Ocean: Patterns and Evolution

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Abstract

Migration has been an attribute of the Indian Ocean World for many years and also associated with risk. Many countries that conduct business around the Indian Ocean have been on the throes of pirate attacks for decades. This study examines the nature of counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean (IO). It identifies the hotbeds of pirate attacks, strategies adopted to strengthen security sector's capacity in dealing with the problem at various levels, prospects of stakeholders' manoeuvrability over piracy, tactical units, interaction wits and international cooperation. It establishes a nexus between counter-piracy and lethal violence in the IO and interrogates the relationship between piracy and the networks of terror around Somali/Horn of Africa axis of the IO. In terms of methodology, the article makes use of qualitative data including secondary sources, media reports and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) dataset. The article maintains that effectiveness of the intelligence system is a factor of successful counter-piracy policy by the littoral states and major world powers. It concludes by stating the need for stakeholders in security market especially states to intensify the stability operations that counter-piracy aims at through more effective collaboration backed by reliable communication oversight as also developed by India.

Keywords: Counter-piracy; Indian ocean; Littoral states; Multinational security; Security stakeholders

Introduction

Previous research established that insecurity creates uncertainty and increases anxiety [1,2]. The establishment of joint security is very paramount in the offensive against pirates or buccaneers and their financiers particularly in terms of setting up well coordinated and swift security architecture that would contain criminality and associated militancy in the seas. As a global phenomenon, the world has been a theatre of security discourse due to the series of threat to human safety by not just animals or technological advancement but also the activities of pirates who operate within the high seas as far as there is navigation of ships or boats. Many countries that conduct business around the Indian Ocean (IO) have been on the throes of pirate attacks for over a decade. Not only the Island countries are vulnerable to the menace of piracy, but also the neighboring countries bordering the ocean and those in Asia and Europe whose ships transact businesses within the enclave. Such illicit activities of pirates led to counter-piracy operations by nations' security forces to fend the threats to human and national security as well as the resolve by policy makers to have priority areas of enhancing maritime safety.

In the context of overseas migration, the Indian subcontinent has been an enclave of labor migration of traders, merchants, missionaries, teachers among others to other parts of the world which is a remarkable attribute of the region's past [3]. Highly significant in this regard is the East Indies which covers a wide geographical expanse in South and South East Asia with various Islands [4]. Indeed, it is noteworthy that travelling by the sea also facilitated this especially through the Indian Ocean (IO) given that people always had reasons to migrate from one enclave to another.

Any discourse on counter-piracy is within the framework of maritime safety and security aimed at forestalling the incessant breakdown of law and order in the high sea by criminal networks that capitalize on the availability of illegal arms in their hands to unleash terror on commuters and vessels. Foreign nationals have been affected by the menace of piracy in the India Ocean which connects different continents and sub-regions.

Literature Review

Historically, the piratical acts of William Captain Kidd, a Scottish sailor led to his eventual execution when found guilty of piracy after his voyage to the Indian Ocean although it is argued that his criminality was not as destructive and lucrative as recorded in the present era [5]. According to the Indian Ocean RIM Association (IORA), 'the Indian Ocean is confronted by notable traditional and non-traditional security challenges namely: piracy, illegal fishing, human trafficking, drug smuggling, trafficking of weapons, maritime pollution and climate change which all account for conventional and non-conventional security threats. There is no disputation that more than ninety five percent of the security challenges are manmade problems that are complicated by greed. For example, it is greed that makes people and companies to still indulge in illicit drug and human trafficking, maritime pollution and weapons proliferation despite capital punishment or sanctions when apprehended by state actors. In addition, they can be categorized as acts of criminality which snowball into human rights violations. Even the climate change that one can easily argue is a natural phenomenon is aggravated by man's unsustainable actions in the environment which lead to ecological crisis. Also, piracy works through an established criminal network with close nexus and communication with gangs of weapons and human traffickers who can also smuggle drugs at the same time.

One noteworthy point is that the activities of pirates downplay the elements/principles of human rights protection as incorporated in teachings of the most religions of the world including Buddhism practiced in some countries around Indian Ocean, which is said to ascribe to universal human rights concept while there is obvious harmony between Buddhist norm of Dhamma and human rights [6]. No doubt, piracy generates a lot of human rights costs to the society. From the abuse of freedom of fear, movement, freedom from want/hunger among others because majority of those abducted when their ship is hijacked or robbed are subjected to misery and all forms of inhuman or degrading treatment.

There is corpus of literature on the economic and security costs associated with maritime insecurity [7-13]. The foregoing is usually aggravated by the sophistication of the criminal networks with attendant lethality and dispossession of unsuspecting people in transit. Most of the works did not critically explore the operational oversight of counter-piracy stakeholders. This is one of the gaps among others that this article fills for knowledge development. Notably, over 80 per cent of trade across the globe are conducted through the sea routes and represents about 93,000 merchant vessels, 1.25 million seafarers and almost six billion tons of cargo annually [7,14]. Of course, thousands of migrants, legal and illegal have increased the number of maritime mobilities globally and the Indian Ocean World is no exception in this regard. Since the 20th Century, merchants, refugees and asylum seekers have increasingly embraced the sea as a means of transport to get to their destination irrespective of the associated risk and lethal violence occasioned by piracy.

In terms of methodology, this study utilized qualitative data including secondary sources, media reports and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) dataset [15]. It explored the innovative strategies mapped out by the security stakeholders to manoeuvre the threats in the area. The UN Security Council Resolutions has been a legal framework for strengthening security sector's capacity in dealing with the problem at national, regional and international levels, the nature of tactical units, interaction wits and international cooperation. It established a nexus between counter-piracy and lethal violence in the Indian Ocean and interrogated the relationship between piracy and the networks of terror around Somali/Horn of Africa axis of the Indian Ocean. Activities in the sea and ocean are numerous, as people transact businesses, interact, network, perpetrate crime, human trafficking for sexual exploitation and servitude, engage in sex trade among others.

Among oceans of the world like Arctic Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Pacific Ocean, Tasman Sea, Indian Ocean is just one of the coastal waters that are at high risk of armed attacks thereby portraying it as volatile for commuters. According to Jimoh "South East Asia, the Horn of Africa (HoA), Gulf of Guinea (GoG), and the Caribbean are still very dangerous waters for the shipping industry from the point of view of economic and human cost" [9]. Some of the institutions that have taking innovative steps to document the incidents are the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Nigeria Watch (NW) which provide data of lethal violence although with varying estimates. The Horn of Africa is one of the troubles with the shipping industry around Indian Ocean. According to Ishay the launching of maritime explorations of the globe can be credited to European countries which pioneered enlightenment [16].

The Indian Ocean is international water which links many routes to various states and is accessible by various countries of the world. It is so strategic that most countries generate revenues through the trade

and transport carried out. The Indian Ocean RIM Association (IORA) reveals that the nations of the Indian Ocean region are apparently diverse in the areas of economic might, land mass (size), population, languages and cultures. They are multicultural and multilingual societies with different forms of government. As their ideological orientations vary also do their economic differ in this regard. Some of these nations are Bangladesh, Comoros, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mozambique, Seychelles, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Yemen, among others as well as their dialogue partners that include, China, Egypt, France, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.

From all indications, the spate of global terrorism, political instability and state failure thesis are all responsible for the proliferation of arms that drive piracy and associated criminality such as 'hijacking of vessels', kidnapping for ransom and armed robberies [8]. Most of these crimes can be placed within the contexts of political and economic marginalization of some groups which led to disputes over natural resources, religious identity/affiliations, and power hierarchies climaxing in armed conflicts, domestic and exogenous militias, mercenaries, and the forced recruitment of civilians with attendant child soldiering soldiers [17].

Events of the past few years have shown that maritime piracy is not peculiar to Asian continent where Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, among others record incidents, as most African countries around the Gulf of Guinea and Gulf of Aden are also increasingly affected [8,9,11,12,18,19]. No wonder why the Maritime Crime Programme of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime mapped out plans for 2015 on ways of facilitating assistance to enhance the capacity of troubled or threatened states in curbing piracy and related forms of maritime crime in East Africa, West Africa, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean, as well as evaluate the needs of other States in the region that have already indicated their areas of need for appropriate intervention, namely Madagascar, Sri Lanka or Yemen [20].

In fact, a recent report credited to the President of Togo, Faure Gbassingbe when he visited Nigeria's President Buhari in Abuja to invite him for a maritime summit in November 2015, rightly pointed out that countries lose about \$7 billion to pirates annually in the Gulf of Guinea as a result of internal security challenges facing majority of countries around the area including porous/unmanned borders Boko Haram terrorism, and underscored the need for collaboration by West African nations to contain piracy given that no single nation can tackle the problem singlehandedly [21]. The report reveals two things: there are linkages between rising insurgency and piracy; the funds lost to pirates are resources that would have been invested in human capital development to enhance nations' millennium development goals and this ugly situation portends grave dangers for infrastructure and the economy of affected nations especially the commerce, industry, energy/petroleum sector, and maritime sector.

In his study on 'Maritime Piracy and Lethal Violence Offshore in Nigeria' investigated if lethal violence offshore is following the same trend as piracy attacks, and onshore in coastal states, found that [9].

Lagos, records the highest number of fatalities, followed by Delta and Rivers states respectively. But when only piracy deaths are considered, Bayelsa State tops the list, followed by Rivers; while 2007 and 2013 were the deadliest years with 30 and 12 fatalities respectively occasioned by piracy offshore.

Such fatalities indicate the sophistication of the pirates who now possess deadly weapons of warfare, meaning that even before they attack, they have already declared war on their targets. Such pirates have also been responsible for some of the misfortunes that occur in the Nigeria's oil industry. According to Okolie-Osemene, the oil industry in Nigeria is associated with disasters, violence, oil spills, and vandalism usually occasioned by the threat to offshore production by pirates, illegal bunkering, vessel hijacking, smuggling, arms proliferation, sabotage, and attacks on production facilities, with debilitating impact on the stability and output of offshore oil and gas assets such as Agbami, Bonga, Usan, and Amenam/Kpono fields [10].

At least, available evidence indicate that militants carried out successful attack on offshore oil facilities including the Niger Delta Peoples' Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) which successfully launched a rattling attack on the oil receptor facilities at Atlas Cove Jetty in the Takwa Bay part of Lagos State on 12 July 2009 with fatalities involving naval ratings and other personnel [10]. Similarly, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) revealed that Nigeria ranked high on the list of countries in the Gulf of Guinea, where piracy and sea robbery held sway in 2013 [22].

Arguably, counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean is a contemporary phenomenon for two reasons. First, the incremental wave of piracy in most parts of the world where the menace of terrorism has forced government authorities to rethink their security strategies which undoubtedly dispersed many non-state armed groups that wield weapons to molest civilians and security targets. Secondly, the strategic significance of the Ocean to various sea routes through Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Africa, Southern Africa and all the Islands in Africa and Asia located in the Indian Ocean, in the areas of commerce, technology, transport and other maritime related values. Counter-piracy is a response to the scale of violence recorded in the Indian Ocean in recent time. Such events showed that piracy is one of the sources of lethal violence in the ocean due to the illegal use of arms by criminal groups.

Herbert-Burns reveals that the northern Indian Ocean constitutes a key sector of the globe's east-west-east trading belt [8]. It is not just an economic base of the countries around the area, but also major world powers which have their economic and security interests domiciled there. Also, the Indian Navy reveals that between 20 and 24 flagged merchant ships of India usually transit the Gulf of Aden monthly and accounts for about 13 percent of the country's trade while her seafaring community is up to 7 percent of the world's seafarers [23]. Based on the economic significance, "the safety and security of maritime routes must concern all governments" [13]. Furthermore, the significance of regional agreements and potentials of the maritime sector made African leaders to adopt the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime (AIM) Strategy in January 2014, aimed at giving the African Union the pedestal to mobilise as many stakeholders as possible [24]. Unfortunately, some of the peoples, precisely about 70 percent of the coastal communities around the Indian Ocean especially towards the African shores are said to be offering support and covering to the pirates who are defenders of their territorial waters to safeguard their fishing grounds [25]. This becomes a challenge to the security operatives.

Deconstructing piracy: Conceptual and theoretical discourse

This article maintains that piracy is an organized crime that is driven by reasoned action of the perpetrators. Piracy is sea terrorism

usually characterized by violence and threats to safety of goods and occupants of ships, boats and everything in transit through the seas or rivers. Usually referred to as buccaneering, it is one of the sources of environmental risk and rather made maritime sector a 'corrosive enclave'. Piracy is the manifestation of crime and associated thievery on the high seas with the perpetrators wielding weapons against unsuspecting commuters who are targeted for dispossession of their belongings. Notably, Onuoha describes piracy as "acts of armed robbery, hijacking and other malicious acts against ships in international waters" [26]. It also means acts carried out with the intent of stealing valuables onboard or extorting money from ship owners or other third-party interests by holding the ship or crew interests to ransom" [14]. The foregoing definitions offer insight into the nefarious activities of pirates who usually have a proclivity for engaging their targets in sea warfare sometimes when they attempt to resist attack or even without any confrontation.

On the other hand, counter-piracy refers to measures put in place by policymakers to manage the problems created by pirates through planning, security rethinking and restructuring or reforms, mapping out grand and military strategies, identifying the hotbeds of piracy on the high sea, funding, provision of logistics, swift investigation of reported cases of pirate attack, formation of tactical units, training of naval officers/naval police, monitoring and evaluation as well as policy implementation to equip the security sector in establishing safer and secure waterways for vessels, humans and investments in the maritime sector. In fact, most sectors of every nation's economy have close links with the maritime industry, hence the need for safer waters that link states with others within and outside their sub-regions. According to Very the stability of the high sea can be realized through the governance of littoral waters by naval officers who must adopt a maritime approach in countering all forms of criminality in the Ocean especially the modus operandi of pirates [13].

Counter-piracy is crucial because pirates always strive to exploit the abundance of the sea as stated in the Book of Isaiah 60:5, and they include human and material resources, and not only the natural resources domiciled in the sea. The problematic is that piracy is the main source of human rights abuses in the Indian Ocean due to kidnapping, armed banditry and lethal violence. As an activity of the nobles, pirates have been able to develop more sophisticated strategies that enable them buccaneer international ships for monetary gains, indicating that such based on the operational techniques, they are not mediocre in maritime operations [25]. Of course, they also not mediocre in the security market considering their use of weapons and wide coverage of the many kilometers offshore.

Studies in piracy and counter-piracy are within the fields of crime control, violence research, counterinsurgency and conflict management which cut across the activities of non-state armed groups which adopt different modus operandi that are dynamic in nature. No doubt, pirates are criminal groups that also strive to undermine every multilateral security effort to pacify them. However, in the Indian Ocean, it also a question of crime control model of transnational security.

There are relevant theories which offer more insight into the causes, nature and effects of (armed) conflicts, mainly because most conflicts that usually lead to arms proliferation are underpinned in structural, realism, frustration-aggression, psychological, economic, psycho-cultural, human needs theory, systemic, and relational, as well as the theory of horizontal inequalities, and the greed - grievance hypothesis as propounded by Paul Collier [27-29]. In the case of Somalia which

hosts armed gangs that trouble Indian Ocean, poor governance and lack of commitment in addressing all forms of political and socio-economic deprivations, radicalization in Muslim community, marginalization and inequality in other communities across undermined security [30-32].

Counter-piracy is more of a military oriented endeavor which requires adequate training on maneuvering tactics and weapons use. In this regard, militarism offers more insight into the counter-piracy by the security forces, involving both internal and external stakeholders within and outside the Indian Ocean World. It is since majority of disgruntled elements that perpetrate the crime of piracy can hardly surrender without the use of coercion. Ochoche maintains that militarization has become a predominant occupation of virtually most countries across the world. Militarization consists of the use of the threat of violence to settle political conflicts, the legitimization of state violence, the domination of military values over civilian life, violation of human rights, extra judicial killings and the gross repression of the people [33]. It is evident that piracy and counter-piracy create a situation where both pirates and security forces directly or indirectly contribute to human rights violations through physical violence and extra judicial killings. In his study, Turshen describes the militarized state as one in which "violence becomes a crisis of everyday life, with political and economic costs. The use of instrument of violence in the form of governance and excessive militarization is aimed at forcing the people particularly dissidents into total submission [34,35]. Louise maintains that militarization is the presence of heavily armed policemen or soldiers patrolling streets, military personnel occupying high government posts, military censorship, armed guards in schools and public buildings, armed checkpoints along roads and curfews [36]. Theoretically, militarism asserts that war is not unjust but that it can be beneficial to society but how it benefits entire society while human rights are being violated with impunity and weak early response from stakeholders remains a controversy both within the context of state violence and stability operation to contain insurgence violence [34,37]. In militarism, which has links with 'just war' theory, there is apparent nexus between the moral dilemma of choosing between respect for human life and the sometimes-unavoidable necessity to kill (such as to protect the innocent) [38]. It is orthodox approach to piracy and related terrorism theory that is premised on the legitimacy/illegitimacy dualism which constructs non-state violence as terror while state violence is legitimate [39]. The foregoing explains why security forces involved in counter-piracy can sometimes attack the pirates to dislodge them and possibly force them to surrender. Militarization has been an instrument in managing transnational crimes to enhance human and national security within states. Arguably, piracy cannot be nipped in the bud without adequate use of military option by engaging the military especially the naval officers to counter the sea robbers.

This is where the Crime Control Model of security as noted by Brewer comes in because it incorporates assertive patrol activity, accelerated police presence with stop and search powers [40]. Based on criminological research, there is arguably no specific socioeconomic factor that can be described as an accurate predictor of criminal behavior whether reasoned, planned or coerced. According to Mohammed there are notable variables that affect the likelihood, volume and type of crimes that occur in particular societies/regions namely, religion, family conditions, median income, job availability, population density, the concentration of youth in a community, community stability, access to education, alcohol and use of drugs, climate/weather, the strength of law enforcement agencies in the

society as well as the attitudes of the communities toward the security operatives [41].

However, in the context of this article, it should be noted that a society that has a history of poor police – public relations would have high rate of crimes. Again, population growth in a society without massive industrialization and job creation by government to address the problem of unemployment queues will produce crime ridden society especially if there are too many jobless youths who are determining to display their skills of deviant behavior in armed banditry. The foregoing explains why fragile states especially those that have weak institutions record incremental wave of violent crimes and that is why the countries of Indian Ocean World need to muster up the courage to back the counter-piracy with people centered development to close the inequality gap.

The operational oversight of counter-piracy stakeholders for a safer Indian Ocean region

The politics of exclusion has always been a source of grievance that motivates activities of spoilers given that excluded groups can make a country ungovernable when they collaborate with disgruntled elements in the form of armed group or social movement seeking self-determination or group sympathy. Just like Nepal where the collapse of the state institutions, social/economic exclusion and the poor accountability characterized governance and resource allocation which later culminated in political instability, the socio-political situation in Somalia which is under the bout of state failure is traceable to clan affiliations that contributed to the fall of Barre's socialist oriented government in 1991 which climaxed in security challenges posed by violent extremism and transnational terrorism with attendant internal displacements in the Horn of African states [31,32,42-48]. But since the establishment of a central authority in Somalia, it would be wrong attribute piracy to lack of joint security operations and governance failure because it has attracted the attention of world leaders including the super powers in recent times. To contain the regional security crisis that also contributes to the piracy in the Indian Ocean, civilian-oriented donor counterterrorism foreign security assistance is operational in Somalia to contain criminal groups around the Indian Ocean [31].

In terms of causation, the following factors are responsible for piracy in littoral states of the Indian Ocean cannot be downplayed. The sources of insecurity in the IO have been identified as, firstly, the established naval presence of multiple of actors like the European Union members, China, India, the United States, Japan and Australia as well as other emerging naval powers such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea which now strategies on ways of expanding their economic and strategic activities in the region, and this hampers the possibility of a comprehensive multilateral agreement on maritime security in the Indian Ocean; and secondly but more threatening, maritime piracy and associated sea-based terrorism which have been escalated by incidents of socio-political and economic instability within some littoral and hinterland states that border the Indian Ocean, with varying degrees of threat to international shipment of goods and services [49,50]. It then means that putting the houses of Indian Ocean World States in order is the first step towards actualizing safer maritime industry, and this must begin with the maintenance of territorial integrity with positive peace to address the prevailing instabilities. The foregoing means that leaders within the Indian Ocean World especially the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and their African Union (AU) counterpart must develop the

political will to address unhealthy rivalry among naval powers, respond swiftly to early warning signals despite ideological differences, a strategy that has the potential of eradicating the sources of piracy and maritime terrorism.

In a bid to caution mariners especially ship controllers on transiting high risk areas, the International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau classifies some prone areas to piracy through its functional early warning system namely, the Indian Ocean off Seychelles, Madagascar, Maldives, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya, Oman, Indonesia, Malaysia, Yemen among others where Somali pirates launch attacks on vessels and sometimes hijack them whether sailing or anchoring with over 70 incidents and 13 high jackings in 2012 alone around Somalia, pointing out that the earlier the Masters detect approaching pirates, the better for the vessel and the occupants, as that would enable them strategies on ways of changing routes for escape through safer areas while requesting for support from relevant authorities. In fact, vessel controllers find it difficult to get assistance when an attack is not reported thereby paving way for the pirates to get away with their nefarious activities of high jacking and hostage taking.

At this juncture, identifying some of the existing counter-piracy units and their involvement in regulating the maritime security around Indian Ocean is crucial. Counter-piracy was conceived from the perception that insecurity anywhere is a threat to security globally, hence the need for transnational/multilateral support particularly by the developed countries to contribute through the provision of funding and military hardware to make the international political system a safer place.

A notable stakeholder is The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which began assisting in the counter-piracy since 2008 for humanitarian reasons which contributed to the establishment of Operation Ocean Shield in 2009 which inherited the legacies of Operation Allied Provider of 2008 and Operation Allied Protector in the first half of 2009 which coordinated joint patrols to thwart high jacking and hostage taking, as well as enhancement of transnational maritime security around the Indian Ocean respectively (NATO, n.d.). As revealed by the Combined Maritime Forces, the UN Security Council Resolutions serve as operational framework of NATO's involvement which rather complements already existing counter-piracy units also championed by the European Union and United States referred to as Atalanta and Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) of January 2009 respectively which are solidly supported by China, India and South Korea and mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1846, 1851, and 1897. This revelation by NATO indicates that counter-piracy is a multinational initiative as far as the situation in the Indian Ocean World is concerned. This means that sustaining such joint security operations would go a long way eradicate the images of maritime insecurity and lethal violence in the Indian Ocean. Of course, the report by Indian Navy shows that counter-piracy has taken a technological dimension with the setting up of the Counter Piracy Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) mechanism to enhance information dissemination between counter-piracy missions/units via a web platform known as mercury net. From all indications, the counter-piracy operations and units are firmly hinged on the crime control model of security because piracy is an organized crime which requires organized and well-coordinated multinational security operations aided by timely information sharing among the major stakeholders. These operations have yielded much result as threat on high sea have drastically decline in recent times as also observed by Siebel's [51].

The stakeholders are numerous considering the multilateral approach to taming the scourge of piracy and associated transnational crimes. just like the India Navy, The Indian Ocean Forum has also been an active player in the counter-piracy activities within the region. Japanese established her naval presence in the Indian Ocean since 2001, when the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) embarked on Operation Enduring Freedom-Maritime Interdiction Operation, a part of the US-leader motivator maritime terrorism, which the JMSDF has been able to sustain her naval unit of counter-piracy from 2009 till date in the Gulf of Aden, and the setting up of a de facto base in Djibouti for piracy abatement purposes with the help of maritime patrol aircraft [49,52,53].

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime the Horn of Africa Programmed was established to contain pirate threats in the Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean but later expanded the scope to address instability, governance problems and poor capacity for criminal justice in the Horn of Africa region; and it yielded desired result after the hijack of the MV Albedo on 12 November 2010 along the Somalia axis, and the negotiation by the UNODC's Hostage Support Program which also worked with the Counter Piracy Office to ensure their safety from when they managed to escaped to the period when they were transported home including crew members from Iran, and countries of the Indian Ocean World such as India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh who are presently still being supported by the Maritime Piracy Humanitarian Response Program (MPHRP) while in their countries of origin [20]. The successful repatriation of the freed hostages from the den of pirates indicates that the UNODC is living up to expectation.

The Counter Piracy Office is saddled with the responsibility coordinating operations. The figure released by the UNODC reveals that piracy prosecutions in the Indian Ocean countries are ongoing with about 4 on remand, 143 convicted and 17 acquitted in Seychelles, while in Mauritius 12 have been acquitted and no suspect standing trial presently. This means much task for the UNODC, NATO, EU, AU, Japan, ASEAN, Seychelles and all the participating nations in the joint security of the area. In the words of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "island nation of the Seychelles has been a leading figure in the fight against maritime piracy, where two new trials commenced began in 2014" [20].

Operation Indian Ocean mainly in Somalia's strategic littoral regions is known for carrying out operations that also made it possible for them to recover eight towns including Golweyn, Bulo Marer, Kurtunwarey, Bulo-Gudud, Tayeeglow, Fidow, Jalalaqsi and the al-Shabaab strongholds of Baraawe and Cadale [54,55]. So far, the International Maritime Bureau has been formidable in assisting nations of the Indian Ocean World and others in countering piracy through establishment of Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in 1992 where activities piracy tracking, monitoring of shipping lanes, monitoring and analyzing early warning systems as well piracy reporting is coordinated (IMB, n.d.).

These have enabled the organization to serve as a think tank in publishing a list of piracy prone areas, hotspots and early warning indicators that often help vessels conveying people and goods around the Indian Ocean; while at the same time serving as emotional outlet for shipmasters and operators of ships when any incident of piracy or high jacking of vessels occurs. The implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 in Resolution A.1025, among other resolutions) on the establishment of Counter Piracy Program

demonstrates the critical nature of maritime security, a step that instituted a legal framework to the counter-piracy measures in the Indian Ocean. Just like in Somalia's Portland State where the Ministry of Marine Transport, Ports and Counter Piracy offered the UNODC a plot of land to construct new police station at the maritime ministry at the Bossaso port city, the organization also sent two Marine Mentors to be actively involved in the Horn of Africa's program in Mogadishu by equipping the Maritime Police Unit of Somali Police Force, specifically training them in boat handling, navigation, seamanship among other related skills needed to fend pirate threats in their axis of Indian Ocean [20]. Such initiative would enhance collaboration between the country and the West in defeating the dreaded pirates. It reaffirms the truism that training leads to mastery of any endeavor and their national assignment is to enhance security and forestall the breakdown of law and order. The issue here is not about who is particularly saddled with the responsibility of playing a leader-motivator role in the counter-piracy but to create the enabling environment and mobilize resources to strengthen the joint security operation for the desired results.

Given that pirates adopt a strategy of using mother ships like hijacked merchant and fishing vessels to extend their operating range in the Indian Ocean, they are notorious in approaching vessels with sophisticated weapons with the aim of intimidating the operator to slow down for boarding to occur to the advantage of the criminals [25]. The moment the controller of a vessel and occupants are overwhelmed by pirates, they lose their freedom and fundamental human rights in general until the pirates are done with them. In response to this audacity by pirates, the UNODC's Counter Piracy Program has been a force to reckon with in the execution of criminal justice related regional efforts in the form of piracy prosecution model which coordinates the transnational naval fleets saddled with the responsibility of intercepting ships of suspected pirates and apprehending any groups or individuals caught in the act of pirate activities around states within the Indian Ocean and took them into custody for prosecution. This is apt and indeed paramount to counter-piracy related criminal justice system as those found guilty are made to face the law while every accused is usually given the opportunity to defend himself as guaranteed by the international human rights instruments that provide for the right to fair hearing. Even the organization's Piracy Transfer Program is credible for giving the convicted pirates the opportunity to serve their sentences in detentions within their states of origin in the Indian Ocean World, thereby giving their governments heads up on the involvement of their national in crime and development of events in that regard.

Among other stakeholders, the International Maritime Bureau has been at the forefront of information and communication of maritime risks, threats and safety measures to the relevant authorities that can implement decisions.

In spite legal challenges and public acceptability complexities, new entrants into the shipping industry's global counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean are the Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSCs) which provide armed guards on merchant vessels protecting crews, cargoes and ships against pirate attacks, have also demonstrated that they are capable based on change of perception now as ship controllers now see embarked security personnel as capable of protecting ships. The problem of adopting this security strategy is that it is not sustainable due to costs involved in such service delivery as only vessels that can afford the payment would be able to move with the private security operatives on the high sea. It then means that while everybody desires safety of his or her vessels, not all can pay the bills

charged by these companies. That is why the multinational joint counter-piracy operations remain the most sustainable approach to curbing piracy in the Indian Ocean.

Conclusion and Suggestion for Further Studies

As maritime terrorism, piracy has been theoretically and practically portrayed as a transnational context of security and economic threat to states. If not for pirate attacks, transacting businesses on the high seas would have been easier and safer than onshore where most armed groups/gangs have their camps while the offshore is difficult to access without flying boats and helicopters.

From available literature, all countries around the Indian Ocean are vulnerable to the menace of piracy which threatens human safety that can only be nipped in the board through consistent counter-piracy measures. This article has explored the operational oversight of counter-piracy stakeholders saddled with the responsibility of fending security and economic threats posed by pirates around the Indian Ocean World. This explains why the Indian Ocean RIM Association stands as one of the international organizations that considers the safety and security of the ocean as very critical to bolstering the transport of people and commodities amongst various states. The foregoing reveals that the aims of international trade would amount to futility when the challenges associated with pirate attacks are not tackled, hence the need for more coordinated efforts in strengthening counter-piracy measures. The fact remains that the level of commitment in terms of allegiance, contribution of logistics and funding of the counter-piracy operations cannot be equal given that economic might and military capability of contributing states are not the same. For instance, the commitments of major world powers like the G20 who have various economic, bilateral and strategic interests cannot be expected to be at the same pedestal with even those Island states within the Indian Ocean that are mainly concerned with their internal affairs and stability and little transactions through the Ocean. The inadequacy of resources also explains why such smaller states cannot perform like the bigger states.

Mitigating the problem of piracy requires timely smashing of networks that encourage illicit drug smuggling, human trafficking for sexual exploitation and labor, as well as those that engage in the proliferation of weapons. It then means that countering piracy financing, recruitment and training within the Indian Ocean must be contained by the stakeholders through multilateral intervention mechanisms namely, promoting state building agenda in fragile states within Africa and Asia to discourage the formation of non-state armed groups that further justify governments' militarism endeavors which has been responsible for the competition for weaponry in the security markets by both states and non-state actors; embarking on the empowerment of youth and women in Indian Ocean World to discourage illicit businesses associated with piracy and human trafficking; as well as the restructuring of the security architecture of the states to contain the menace of terrorism that creates a fertile ground for piracy. For example, if Al-Shabaab group is totally eradicated from Somalia, it would mean a safer zone for the Indian Ocean World because their presence in the Horn of Africa is a threat to the India Ocean safety. Above all, stakeholders like governments, community leaders and civil society groups need to have a grasp of the fact that every pirate is from a community and family that should be made to know the implications of criminality and discourage their youth from engaging in such heinous acts. It then means that all communities must be involved in information gathering by identifying

the occupations of their sons and daughters in the Indian Ocean World, to know whether they are involved in legitimate businesses or not.

It is apparent that based on the force of regional co-operations in promoting multinational operations to contain piracy, disarming the criminal gangs and bringing them to book is achievable. Such initiative must be situated within the human security need of the government fulfilling its social contract for the people through good governance expected to have appreciable impact on sustainable livelihoods with attendant positive effect on life expectancy by enhancing the people's quality of life. Additionally, robust reorientation at the community level to enable families caution their deviant relatives or children will go a long way to checking the enrolment of more pirates into the illicit business. This preventive approach can be less expensive to governments of the Indian Ocean World in terms of human and material costs, because countering pirates is not only financially demanding, but also time consuming and associated with fatalities. The idea of counter-piracy is that a nation that does not control her territorial waters cannot be said to have control of its national borders as attacks can come from militants or armed gangs through the sea without much resistance by the naval officers.

It is suggested that scholars of security studies, conflict management and violence research should consider embarking on further studies to investigate the nexus between criminal factor in maritime accident and counter-piracy in the Indian Ocean World as well as the perception of different ethno-religious groups about the piracy in the region. This would enhance people's understanding of the evolving security situation in such a corrosive enclave. It is evident that such studies will also contribute to knowledge development in international security based on the crime control model of counter-piracy operations.

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