

“Investigating the Causes of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa” Case Study: The Central African Republic and South Sudan

Agberndifor Evaristus

Department Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey

ABSTRACT

Civil wars are not new and they predate the modern nation states. From the time when nations gathered in well-defined or near defined geographical locations, there has always been internal wrangling between the citizens and the state for reasons that might not be very different from place to place. However, the tensions have always mounted up such that people took to the streets first to protest and sometimes, the immaturity of the government to listen to the demands of the people radicalized them for bloodshed. This paper shall empirically examine the cause of civil wars in Sub-Saharan Africa having at the back of its thoughts that civil wars are most times associated to political, economic and ethnic incentives. This paper shall try in empirical terms using data from already established research to prove these points. Firstly, it shall explain its independent variables which apparently are some underlying causes of civil wars. Secondly, it shall consider the dense literature review of civil wars and shall look at some definitions, theories of civil wars and data presented on a series of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Lastly, it shall isolate two countries that will make up its comparative analysis and the explanations of its dependent variable by which it shall seek to understand what caused the outbreaks of civil wars in those two countries. The arguments to be made about the causes of civil wars in the isolated cases shall either prove or disprove the hypothesis of the study and this will in effect have an effect on the formulation of a theory.

Keywords: Civil war; Gross domestic product per capita; Ethnicity

INTRODUCTION

Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner define civil war as a large scale organized violence on the part of a rebel army. Moreover, civil wars are different from place to place and do not usually have the same duration. However, most rebel organizations that engage government forces either have political or religious ambitions. Previous research indicates that the duration of civil wars is determined by different factors from their onset. Grossman think that civil wars are caused by rebels who operate with selfish interests aimed at generating profits from looting so that ‘the insurgents are indistinguishable from bandits or pirates.

It’s important to correct an erroneous thought here. Before the arrival of colonial powers there have been civil wars in Africa. It’s erroneous to think that the modern nation states of Africa suffer from civil wars as a result of their colonial pasts. Though it

might not be far-fetched to think that there are twinning reasons that account for the current civil wars in Africa in tandem to their colonial pasts, it shouldn’t be over belabored. Consequently, civil wars have emerged as the principal threats to national and international political stability [1]. This is because the outbreak of civil war in one country directly exports refugees to neighboring countries who have no choice but to accept them since they are all signatories of Human Rights and International Refugee Conventions. More so, it’s an act of solidarity to a neighbour in distress because the next day might be yours. However, accepting refugees from civil war stricken countries comes with serious security challenges and threats to the domestic politics and stability of the hosting country as the refugees might turn out to be a serious security threat themselves either through organized crime, or the spread of diseases. Civil wars are far more common than international conflicts which were once very famous in times antique. As a matter of fact, all

Correspondence to: Agberndifor Evaristus, Department Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul Aydin University, Istanbul, Turkey, Tel: +16198929723; E-mail: agberndifore@gmail.com

Received date: Jan 17, 2019; **Accepted date:** Jun 25, 2019; **Published date:** Jul 02, 2019

Citation: Evaristus A (2019) Investigating the Causes of Civil Wars in Sub-Saharan Africa” Case Study: The Central African Republic and South Sudan. J Pol Sci Pub Aff 7:363.

Copyright: © 2019 Evaristus A. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

of the 15 major armed conflicts listed by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute for 2001 were internal. More so, there have been 79 large civil wars conflicts that occurred between 1960 and 1999.

Before this study looks at the determinants of civil wars it holds the hypothesis that “polarization causes civil war” and the literature review underneath will either prove or disprove it. Therefore, this study shall look at the different determinants of civil wars in Africa with particular emphasis on its special cases. However, it shall at this time, fix its eyes on any possible factor which might be regarded as the overall determinant. Nevertheless, it maintains its eyes on the arguments of Collier and Hoeffler who are convinced that civil wars are solely due to economic reasons. The economic theory of civil wars shall be discussed below [1]. By the end of this study it shall be seen if the assertions of the aforementioned scholars and the data they collected in their study are correct or if there other alternative determinants either not mentioned or overlooked. Furthermore, this study shall like to mention strongly that though the determinants of civil wars might be almost similar in some Western countries, it’s much more different in Africa as a result of its densely meshed work of ethnic and tribal complexities. Therefore, An approach to understanding civil wars in Africa supports the ideals of Collier and Hoeffler, Quinn, Hetcher and Wibbles, Quinn, Hetcher and Rohner who believe that ethnicity is a strong incentive to civil war and take much time to find ways to measure it [1]. In support, Stevens (2009) looks at the fundamental reason behind the mass killings in civil if they have any link to ethnicity and lastly, Nichols examines if genocide during crises episodes is related to ethnicity.

However, before discussing civil wars in relation to its case study and in empirical terms and with all data available, this study would like to make a strong explanation of its independent variables which it hopes to use as a sentiment to lay a strong emphasis for what the determinants of civil wars might be.

DISCUSSING THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Populism

From the colonial era, there have been populist movements in Africa most of which unfortunately were dismantled by a ruthless arm of colonial powers. Some early examples of populist movements are those of the Douala people in the Littoral region of Cameroon who stood up against the Germans when they breached the 1884 Germano-Douala Treaty [2]. Ngoh explains that the fate of these early populists who included Rudolf Douala Manga Bell, Ngoso Din, William Samba and King Akwa was death [2]. However, their fights didn’t end with their deaths instead, anti-German sentiments deepened and exploded in 1914 when the First World War broke out.

Populism is simply an act of defending the interests of the people against an existential threat. It’s also claiming to be fighting for the general interests of the general public, most times the majority who are below the privilege line. This threat could be either domestic or foreign. Most times, the populist evangelist portrays himself as the solution and salvation against a corrupt and polluted system that oppresses and kills [3]. A

good example of a populist who blasts any other possible inspiration and talent that could bring substantial benefits to his country is Samuel Shafiihuma Nujoma the first president of The South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and former president of Namibia. Having stepped down from power in 2005 he continues to assert that his party is what is needed to save the country from foreign domination. As such, other political parties are seen as surrogates with a hidden agenda aimed to sell the country to Western hegemony rather than fight for the emancipation and total liberation of their state. These assertions are daring and have always faced strong criticisms [3].

Hence, populists see no other as good and fit to take power but the incumbent ruler even if he has nothing to offer and has to die in power to achieve nothing significant. Messara identifies that populism has different patterns in different regions and in Africa it’s mostly an advocacy for the poor and targeting failed governments stabbed with corruption [4]. This difference in part is due to political cultures in different regions. These political cultures are also ingredients that exert some level of pressure on political practitioners and the roles they play in exerting their influence on policy making.

Following the natural ideal of populists they commonly raise the interests of the people first by whom they manage to gain both local and some foreign support. Another example of populism is in Zimbabwe which shows that populism could also mean a direct attack against a politician and public figure or personality. For instance, attacks directed against the Late Morgan Tsvangirai, leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) who was denied his presidential office twice after beating veteran Robert Mugabe [3]. The reason forwarded by incumbent Mugabe and his regime at the time simply rested on the liberation wars that Mugabe fought in the yesteryears which his die hard opponent, Morgan Tsvangirai didn’t [5]. This study is of the opinion that this could possibly be the reason why the judiciary and legislative institutions mindless of the integrity of the constitution and the law, repeatedly overlooked his victories and preferred to relinquish full power back to Mugabe who at the time continued to enjoy the status of a war veteran and liberation hero. Furthermore, Tsvangirai on the other hand and supposedly deficient of these glorious historical attributes, was subject to disdain, always attacked and distrusted by many who didn’t see him as fit for the office because he supposedly lacked the historical glories of the war of liberation. Using the wars of liberation as an alibi to hang onto power might have lasted for a while but may not be a dependent political strategy which is subject to faint with the passing times. Nonetheless, the changing global order ensures that time passes quickly. Populism on this regard was promoted by the majority and the leading regime in power against a selective minority.

Corroborating to this fact, the tables turned and the same generals who supported Mugabe’s sermons against Tsvangirai fell out with him and led a bloodless coup which oversaw his definite demise in mid-2018 [6]. In the Zimbabwean case, the populist perpetrator just like in Namibia was the president but in Cameroon in the 1960s-1970s it was a political resistant movement [3,7]. In Southern Africa it’s asserted that populism enjoys an elastic reign due to the remnants of the liberation

struggles who are still deified beyond measure. The latter mindful of the importance of this glory do not hesitate to use it as a strong political tool to achieve their objective.

As Melber noticed populism in Africa is mostly propagated by old men (gerontocracies) who have been in power since the 1970s. These fellows purport to know the country and its history more than anyone else and according to them, they fit for the job of defending the nation eternally because they saw the different political, social, economic transitions that took place in their countries. According to their arguments that puts them in a forte of power and influence, worth trusting to pilot the affairs of the state till death do them part or until a coup initiates a forceful and sometimes bloody divorce. Considering this premise, it surely explains beyond reasonable doubt why Mugabe claimed some years earlier and with outmost exuberance that "only God who appointed me will remove me, not the MDC, not the British"[8]. Similarly, Nujoma of Namibia and former leader of SWAPO prophesied that "his party will remain in power for a thousand years" Melber and Jacob Zuma of South Africa who also used the liberation war rhetoric many times in his defense against the charges laid against him said that the "ANC will rule until after Jesus returns" [3,6].

An example of a radical populist party was the Union Des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) which remorselessly engaged the Cameroon-Franco colonial military for more than a decade [9]. Their constant exchanges brought French speaking Cameroon at the time to the knees of a civil war. The grievances of the UPC were simple; they demanded the unconditional exit of the French colonial administration which at the time was co-administrating French Cameroon with its first president, El Hadj Amadou Ahidjo. Furthermore, they frowned at their gross disrespect and mistreatment of the Cameroonian people. Takougang acknowledges that the fight of the UPC rebels was highly sacrificial and selfless [10]. They put their compatriots first and didn't mind their own lives to the death. More so, at the epicenter of the fight was the reunification of Cameroon which historically was one before the arrival of the Germans. Following the defeat of the Germans in 1914, the territory was divided by the French and the British in the Milner-Simon Treaty of 1919. Thus, creating two Cameroons one administered by the French called La Republique Du Cameroon and the other administered by the British called The British Southern and Northern Cameroons. The example of the UPC which at the time was regarded as a rebel organization, loaded with a sophisticated agenda that did not only shake the political, economic and social foundations of the two Cameroons but equally brought great inspirations to other African countries, shows how violent some populist movements can be. Similarly, the example of Namibia also shows how pacific others could be. Whatever the case, populists once in motion are good at striding emotional tides and raising sentiments high. Another example of a rising and very daring populist movement which has brought the same Cameroon to its knees in an ongoing civil war that has lasted for almost three years is the separatist or secessionist calls of the English speaking minority of Cameroon internationally recognized as Ambazonians [11]. Contrary to the UPC fighters who sought to reunify Cameroon, they seek a break away because they complain they are badly marginalized by

the majority French speaking government [12]. The deteriorating sociopolitical crisis in Cameroon before its unrepentant explosion in 2016, has long been known as the Anglophone problem but which only gained strong steam in 2016 when popular uprisings started in the Former British Southern Cameroons dubbed Ambazonia [13,14].

Lastly, King and Lawrence see a more brutal and violent expression of populist expressions to be that of the Rwandan genocide which claimed the lives of over 800,000 Tutsis who were the dominant and ruling tribe in Rwanda thanks to a biased colonial legacy. They add that the Hutus who saw them as bossy and unnecessarily important over them decided to take the bulls by the horns in a second bloody assault which killed more Tutsi's than had previously died in the 1960s in the first wave of Hutu attack. The social division that Mobutu Sesse Sekou Owabanga of Congo incited divided the country and led to a formidable attack and involvement of many countries in the Great Lake regions which is considered the First World War of the African kind. The war claimed over one million lives and though Mobutu was deposed from power, calm hasn't returned to the region.

In the Central African Republic were state orchestrated violence is a political culture and coups a norm entrenched in the socio-political annals of the state, the main populist has always been the ruling Christian government. Katz explains that when the Muslim Seleka rebels took power in 2012 they had as main aim to exact revenge on the majority Christian dominated country that had badly marginalized them for more than a decade [15]. However, things didn't go on well and they lost power to international pressure. Furthermore, their demise from power led the country straight to a sectarian war and ethnic cleansing with them the Muslims facing the worst threats of all [15]. The situation is similar to South Sudan where the main populist being the president in power is accused regardless of many negotiations to have refused to give democracy and the alternation of power a chance. When South Sudan got its independence from Sudan in 2011 Salva Kiir its first president was supposed to rule the country for four years and then organize democratic elections. However, he didn't and sought to clinch onto power. His clinging onto power brought a rift between him and his vice president, Riek Machar, now rebel leader and main opposition who wants him out of power by peace or by force. Alas, the political tussle between them has dug a well of social fractionalization and ethnic conflicts. Regardless of the many negotiations that have been initiated by the African Union and other international players, the opposition insists Mr. Salva Kiir must leave because it's his clinching onto power that has brought the country to its present desolate state which has also costed the lives of over 50,000 people and displacing over 1.6 million others. Barely five years after its independence, the nation has known no peace and has led many to their deaths in a bloody civil war that has lasted for more than 6 years. This study understands that Salva Kiir was one of the rebels who fought alongside the late John Garang against the government of Sudan when they demanded for their independence. The late John Garang who led the South Sudan Liberation Army to the negotiation tables settled the case for the country's long awaited future. Thanks to the agreement for cessation, he became the

vice president of Sudan and first ever president of South Sudan whose independence at the time was pending. Moreover, he had been able to secure an agreement with northern Sudan through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement which gave South Sudan the chance to become independent through a referendum that was to be organized six years after the signing of the peace deal [16]. During that time he was assisted by current Salva Kiir who occupied the position of vice rebel leader during the war of liberation and subsequently, vice president when independence was close. Therefore, his military past makes him a war hero and though South Sudan is not in Southern Africa where war heroes have held onto power till death do them part, just maybe he is being influenced by the same rhetoric and doesn't see his vice president, now main opposition leader or any other as befitting to take the baton of command of the nation. Regardless of the disaster that his greed has brought to the country, and the many thousands who have died, he refuses to let go. Populism is a blindness that eats the possessor even do his grave and sometimes he doesn't see it the way it is.

Polarization

As the name might suggest, polarization causes distrust of the political system thus, threatening democratic governance [17]. Some scholars see it to have positive fruits that can lead to good governance and inciting democracy. However, it's also feared that despite the benefits that can be gotten, it breaks inter party bond, threatens the unity of policy making and the establishment of democratic values and norms [18]. In simpler terms polarization simply means division in a political party or government. Nichols adds that other factors including regime type, prior conflict, level of development, ethnic, religious, and ideological differences are the factors generally associated with the risk of polarization. To make it easier she continues that environmental factors that can both lead to disease, famine and poverty increase the probability of the above mentioned and can incite more division between the ruling elite to such an extent that the government doesn't only suffer a rift but it sadly boils down to either ethnic conflict or political violence. Furthermore, she adds other indicators such as low level of economic development, poverty, income incompatibility between regions and environmental policies as causative agents as well. In clearer terms, when the government decides to favour or develop a region while using another as the refuse dump may lead to serious clashes between the elite. In addition, she adds that while environmental factors cannot be over stretched, the ethnic characters of the ruling elite are other conditions necessary for the outbreak of civil war. The "my tribe first" mentality rationally corroborates with Bayart's culture brokers who mediate between the ruling tribe and the entire nation creating economic profits for themselves by selling social services and governmental positions that are otherwise free, merit based

and indispensable for the livelihoods of people in the nation. Thus, stirring grudges, anger and ethnic differentiation which might lead to bloody confrontations. As it shall be seen when discussing the dependent variable below, the political misunderstanding of the ruling elite, may boil down to ethnic tensions which can lead straight away to civil war.

GDP, population and education

The economic performance of a country and the distribution of wealth is an important determinant which will either create the conditions necessary for civil wars or that will immediately discourage any radical armed conflict. Quinn, Hechter and Wibbles are convinced that econometric deficiencies and deficits in economic growth could be accused for the rise of civil wars. More so, they are convinced that rebels usually rise up when either their economic rights, religious or political rights which are infringed. More so, slumbering economic developments provide a convenient ground for a sudden surge of grievances which could be translated to war [1]. Collier and Hoeffler second them in this argument and demonstrate with statistical data that the GDP of countries stricken with civil wars reduces considerably. One of the rational reasons might be the diversion of resources that were otherwise meant for developmental projects and growth. Hence, the outbreak of violent conflicts pushes affected states to look at strengthening their military in order to counter the insurgents. So, how long the civil war lasts, will determine if the country will be able to return to its stated goals and objectives or if it will just succumb to its socio political wounds and shrink to a collapsed state. Firstly, they make a list of countries in Africa which have had civil wars and the list consists countries that have experienced civil wars between the periods of 1962-1990s. This study is of the opinion that the data is limited because their statistical findings were taking from five year periods beginning from 1962 and up till the late 1990s. By then, Sudan in particular was still having its civil war; and Congo was warming up to have an outburst in 1997 and a one that will claim many thousands of lives.

Table 1 below lacks some vital information which I added because this development came much later after the study had been done. That includes the Central African Republic which has had (2 civil wars from 2003-2007 and from 2014-on going), South Sudan (1 civil war from 2015-ongoing), and Cameroon. On Table 1 Cameroon has 1 civil depending on the data that was taking in the 1960s. However, the recent development in the country from the late 2016 gives it another red feather on the cap making it 2 civil wars (2016-on going). In the lines below I shall isolate the Central African Republic and South Sudan whom I will use as my special cases for comparison as to what caused the break of civil war in them.

Table 1: Below shows the list of countries that have had civil wars from 1965-2004.

Country	War	Country	War	Country	War	Country	War
Algeria	1962-1963	DRC	1960-1965	Liberia*	1989-1990	Somalia*	1982-1997

Algeria*	1992-2000	DRC*	1993	Liberia*	1992-1995	Sierra Leone*	1991-1996
Angola*	1975-2000	DRC	1996-2000	Liberia*	1996	Sierra Leone*	1998-2000
Angola*	1992-1994	Mozambique*	1979-1992	Liberia	2003	Congo Rep.*	1997-1999
Angola*	1998-2001 2002-	Burundi*	1972	Cote d'Ivoire	2002-ongoing (at the time of research)	Ethiopia*	1974-1991
South Africa*	1989-1993	Burundi*	1988	Guinea Bissau*	1998	Nigeria*	1967-1970
South Africa*	1999-2002	Burundi	1991-1992	Sudan	1963-1972	Nigeria*	1980-1981
Cameroon	1959-1961	Burundi	1993-1998	Sudan*	1983-1992	Nigeria	1984
Cameroon*	2016-on going	Burundi	2000-2002	Sudan*	1995-on going (at the time of study)	Chad*	1966-1971
Uganda	1966	Uganda	*1980-1988	Uganda*	1996-2001	Chad	1980-1988
Uganda	2004-on going (at the time of research)	Rwanda	1963-1964	Zimbabwe*	1972-1979	Chad	1990
Rwanda*	1994	Rwanda	1998				

Source: Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009, cited Gleditsch, 2004)

Table 2: Economic theory of civil war.

	Sample (n=1167)	NO civil war (n=1089)	Civil war (n=78)
War starts	0.067	0	1
Primary commodity exports/GDP	0.168	0.169	0.149
GDP per capita (const. US\$)	4061	4219	1645
Diaspora (relative to population of country of origin)	0.017	0.018	0.004

Male secondary schooling (% in school)	43.42	44.39	30.3
Peace duration (months since last conflict)	327	334	221
Forest cover (%)	31.11	31.33	27.81
Mountainous terrain (%)	15.82	15.17	24.93
Geographic concentration of the population (Gini)	0.571	0.569	0.603
Population density (inhabitants per square km)	150	156	62
Population in urban areas (%)	45.11	46.00	32.7
Ethnic fractionalization (index, 0-100)	39.57	38.64	52.63
Religious fractionalization (index, 0-100)	36.09	35.98	37.70
Polarization $\alpha = 1.6$ (index, 0-0.165)	0.077	0.077	0.077
Democracy (index, 0-10)	3.91	4.07	1.821
Ethnic dominance (% with main ethnic group 45-90%)	0.465	0.465	0.465
Income inequality (Gini)	0.406	0.406	0.410
Land inequality (Gini)	0.641	0.641	0.631

Table 2 above reveals that the GDP of countries stricken by civil war reduces and their results even predicted that based on their GDP these countries most of which had a history of more than one civil war were under normal circumstances, prone to have more. The GDPs per capita (US\$) dropped by more than 72% from \$4219 during peace episodes to a stunning \$1645 during war times. Similarly, taking a country like the Central African Republic which has huge diamond deposits and South Sudan with unthinkable oil deposits as their primary commodity exports among others such as timber, uranium and other agricultural products, they all dropped from 0.169% at a time of relative peace episodes to a sadly 0.149% at war times. The question is who was in charge of the commodity exports during the war? In the Central African Republic the answer will definitely be the tussle between the government, the Anti-Balaka and Seleka warring factions. However, in South Sudan, it might be asked further if it is the rebels or the government who are in charge of the oil fields as both need military financing in order to maintain or increase their offensive steam? Another stunning revelation from Table 2 reveals that the diaspora population of countries drops during civil war and the units move from 0.018 at peace times to 0.004. This study would like to rationally analyze that for poor and underdeveloped countries, the

diaspora in part contributes immensely through remittances which are essential for both human security development and also for national development, growth and the alleviation of poverty. As a matter of fact, Human Rights Watch admits that two forward proponents of the Ambazonian (Southern Cameroons) quest for independence, that is in the names of Mark Baretta and Tapang Ivo Tanku, had ingeniously made many fund raisings online whereby thousands of Euros and US dollars were raised and sent to the resistant fighters on Ground Zero, the nickname of Ambazonia [19]. These monies have recurrently been raised by the aforementioned and sent back to Cameroon where they have supposedly been used to purchase arms and feed the fighters. Some have equally been used to support the hundreds of thousands of internally and externally displaced persons some of who reside in Ghana and Nigeria. The Cameroon Anglophone diaspora until now remains the foremost sponsor and financial support of the Anglophone resistance and breakaway from Cameroon. To add more light to this fact, some foreign embassies in the country purportedly under the warnings of the Cameroonian government discriminate against Anglophone Cameroonians and rationally deny them visas or make them go through the eye of the needle to get one. Fomeni full of anger wrote a harsh letter to the

German Ambassador to Cameroon whose diplomatic mission according to his analysis stands out as the first in this discrimination of issuing visas to Anglophone Cameroonians. He reminded the Ambassador that the current civil war in Cameroon is a progeny of the systemic marginalization of the Anglophones in Cameroon who currently want to break away from Cameroon and him practicing discrimination and marginalization doesn't distinguish him from Cameroon. Instead, it sells a pitiful image of Germany which is regarded worldwide as a country with a record of liberal democracy and saddled on impeachable institutions. The rationale according to them is simply to reduce the number of Anglophones who aim to travel out of the country supposedly to hustle and support their ailing brothers back home.

It's worth adding that a stable country might have an increasing diaspora with higher remittances that can help to bolster its economy. World Remitt a leading online money transfer company revealed that remittances sent by the Cameroonian diaspora rose to about \$300 m in 2018 as opposed to \$278 m according to figures provided by the World Bank [20]. These figures are opposed to Sama who had earlier reported that moneys sent by the Cameroonian diaspora to Cameroon had amounted to over \$1.6 billion [21]. Whatever the case, if the diaspora of war stricken countries such as South Sudan and The Central African Republics continue to send huge sums of money back home both for the subsistence of their families and as finance to either of the warring factions, then the war is set to go on for ages. However, considering the drop in the population of the diaspora of war stricken countries, taking South Sudan and the Central African Republic as case study, this study is of the opinion that the diaspora maybe badly affected by the war in their country decided to return to either fight with one of the grieving parties or to seek for peace. If this hypothesis is true then it accounts for the drop of GDP per capita growth as well. Moreover, rich countries like Saudi Arabia with over \$6000 of GDP per capita a with very rich government and with high financial reserves will almost not fall into the pit of civil wars because the government on its own, can quench any armed insurrection without demanding for any foreign financial aid. Moreover, regardless of the grievances of the citizens, the good life they enjoy they might scorn at the thought of a civil war that can bring in potential predators that will pray on their economy, destroy their culture, identity and nation. Moreover, a reduction of the diaspora would also mean a reduction of the sources of finance for both the loyalist forces and the rebels. Quinn, Hetcher and Wibbles supports that one of the sources of rebel finances comes from the diaspora and other hostile governments. Talking about hostile governments they make an example of the role Zimbabwe, then called Southern Rhodesia, played in financing the Renamo rebellion in Mozambique.

They continue that cutting the source support from the diaspora might either frustrate one of the parties or push both to extra-common avenues which might include extracting raw materials and Lutable resources to sell. In some extreme cases humans can be trafficked for either sex or money as its in Syria (US Department of State, 2018). The case of the Central African Republic remains pertinent because when the war broke out in 2013 there are speculations that some regional powers such as

Chad, South Africa and France were accused of being directly responsible for the war because they had interests in its vast diamond fields [22,23]. Moreover, Flanagan, Koura and Eckel are of the thought that The Central African Republic and South Sudan which are mineral rich countries might be disintegrating rapidly due to their mineral resources which possibly stand at the forefront of rebel and government interests [23,24].

Another important point to address as shown in the Table 2 is the population size with respect to government control and its ability to silence any armed group that might disturb the territorial integrity of the state. According to the data above the population density that is inhabitants per square kilometer reduces from 156 during peace times to a stunning 62 during civil war. When the population becomes sparingly concentrated it also makes it difficult to control the movements of people. This also brings many challenges as some insurgents can hide in safe heavens such as mountains, forests where they build garrisons from which to attack the central government. Fischer reveals that while working as a diplomat in Sudan Michel Djotodia, the rebel leader recruited mercenaries who later helped his military coalition to fight the central government [25]. Considering the weak border controls of the country that separates The Central African Republic with Chad and Sudan, it was easy for him to build a garrison there which later became his strategic base of operations until he marched into Bangui the capital city in March, 2013 as the new strong man of the nation. His success came strong as a result of "the presence of a rough terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power which favored his insurgency prompting the civil war the nation currently suffers. So, should the availability of foreign, cross-border sanctuaries such as the Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries he recruited be available, and a local population that can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agents" it's sure that the rebellion and their offensive will succeed [26].

Furthermore, the data from Table 2 further reveals that terrain really matters during war times and it also affects the tactical ability of both the rebel and loyalist forces on the ground. More so, during conflict periods 25% of the terrain is mountainous, versus only 15% in peace episodes, though there might be varying differences in forest cover. Furthermore, they add that low urbanization of a country and a dense but rather sparingly dispersed population might be detrimental to the strength of a country's military and its ability to respond to conflict. Similarly, high rates of rural populations makes it difficult for governments to exert full control over their territory and it mounts as a side effect to address elements of radicalization which might spew to war [1]. To stop this from happening, developmental programs enacted by the governments of the Central African Republic and South Sudan should strive to reduce the expansion of rural communities by harmonizing population dispersion and density within the country. For this to happen the state and its institutions must be legitimate and able to control their entire territory otherwise, the nation falls into a failed state as it's the case with the Central African Republic and South Sudan where huge portions of their land are controlled by rebel groups. In the Central African Republic the Anti-Balaka are in control of most of the country [15].

Furthermore, the table above shows that the percentage of children going to school during peace episodes and war times varies considerably. During peace episodes 44.39% males attend secondary school and would probably not enroll in any insurgency activity due to a restraint of the knowledge they acquire and the goals they might have fixed for themselves. However due to income inequalities (Gini) which stand at 0.406% at peace times but increase to 0.410% at war times and land inequalities, the percentage of Males attending secondary schools to either enlist with the rebel group or emigrate from the country drops to 30.3%. By 2012 just a year after the declaration of the independence of South Sudan from a fifty years war of independence from the dominant Muslim north, more than three quarters of its adults couldn't read or write. As a matter of fact, "South Sudan is believed to have the worst literacy rate in the world, worse than Mali and Niger, which were the only ones close". The literacy level as of 2012 stood at 27% [27]. 'When South Sudan became independent, many believed that things will turn around and literacy levels backed by modern educational policies would bring a turn around. Little did they know that only two years later and successively for over five years after their independence, they would be back to their own vomit. As for the Central African Republic its adult literacy stood at 36.8% in 2015. Similarly, the country had experienced a steady growth of its literacy rates from 18.2 % in 1975 to 36.8 % in 2015 growing at an average annual rate of 26.89 % [28]. Sadly, with the persistent war in the country, its sure that schools are for the most part in the country ineffective and literacy levels might have dropped drastically. The low levels

of literacy in both Sudan and the Central African Republics baked by a competent reason to war might also bring in enriching reasons why many should enlist to a group of their choice. This unfortunately, makes easy recruits for either of the warring factions. Quinn, Hetcher and Wibbles explain that education, income flow and GDP will determine the percentage of recruits who will stay in the war. However, they see a correlation between low income, high education and dissertation. Similarly, male secondary school education has an effect on the availability and longevity of recruits during civil war times. This is because changing perceptions may affect recruitments and staying loyal to the logic of the war. Thus, lower economic growth will affect education policies, infrastructure and resources and this might lead to higher unconstitutional change 'patronage or renting' which might be geared at appeasing deadly opposition members who cannot be bought. Finally, this could be an open haven for serious confrontation mostly spurred by the educated majority who suffer down the ladder. From here a twist is seen as the educated youths might enlist to warring parties to fight, thus, changing the dynamics and tactics of the war.

Before jumping deeply into the economic theory of civil wars proposed by Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, it's important to consider the measurements of Quinn, Hetcher and Wibbles who chose to add a set of items that is State Strength 1, State Strength 2 and State Strength 3, Religious Diversity, Ethnic diversity 1 and Ethnic Diversity 2. Table 3 presents the results of all their findings.

Table 3: An Explanation of the Economic Theory of Civil Wars.

	Constant	SS1	SS2	SS3	Relig	Eth1	Eth2	⊗ 2kk
Log (per capita GDP)	0.733	0.862	-	-	-	-	-	0.257
Log (population)	6.193	-	-0.631	-0.649	-	-	-	0.164
Log (% mountainous)	1.527	-0.156	-	0.372	-	-	-	0.835
Oil exporter	-1.208	0.357	-	-	-	-	-	1.000
New state	-2.116	-	-	0.423	-	-	-	1.000
Relig. Frac.	1.682	-	-	-	0.875	-	-	0.234

Source: Quinn, Hetcher and Wibbles (2003)

Quinn, Hetcher and Wibbles agree that despite the cultural intersecting aspects that prompt one to judge amiss about the possible causes of civil wars, they hold on fast to the premise that statistically backed causes of civil wars reveal that economic variables determine civil wars. Furthermore, they insist that there is this wrong notion out there that cultural aspects on their own can incite civil wars. On the contrary, they believe that the strength of institutions plays a dynamic role in either

quenching or fuelling civil wars. This study was then careful to observe the case of the Central African Republic that has very weak institutions which themselves have been prone to political assaults by its different presidents and administrations. These over the years, have deepened the social fractionalization of the country thereby largely exposing it to civil wars. Consequently, it has suffered two and its second is the longest and the most devastating. This study also believes that the case is same with

South Sudan which has fallen to the failed state category because the state institutions were tampered with and undermined by the current administration. Consequently, the legitimacy of Mr. Salva Kiir's government is seriously questioned by different ethnicities in his country which might have been lost first, at the political levels and then to every other aspect of national unity. Furthermore, according to the data on Table 3 weak states like the Central African Republic (henceforth C.A.R.) and South Sudan, lack the capacity to deter any sudden rise of grievances, monitor antiregime grievances and sanction them immediately whose surge might have a lasting deteriorating effect on the nation. So, the tendency for insurgency to escalate beyond reasonable calculation is significantly apparent [1].

From Table 3 GDP is positively associated with oil export and negatively associated with mountainous terrain and political instability. Furthermore, under state strength 2 the state lacks the capacity to maintain its full control over the entire nation thus, giving room for anti-regime and other rebellious activity. This is particularly true for South Sudan and C.A.R. which have lost parts of their territories to rebel groups. In C.A.R. the Anti-balaka controls most of the country and makes the law against the Muslim minority against whom they seek revenge [19]. In South Sudan the opposition leader Machar controls certain portions of the capital, Juba, and other parts of the country where his forces constantly battle government militia [29]. Moreover, the state strength 3 reduces again and is negatively associated with mountainous terrain or population but instead claims that new states have strong stability. The example of South Sudan, unfortunately, dismisses this claim because the country has been in civil war and promising for over 5 years now. While it may not be used as a stereotype that all new states are weak, considering that Timor Leste that became independent in 2002 and Kosovo that gained its independence in 2008 are relatively stable [30,31]. From Table 3 it can be deduced that countries with a strong control over their national territories fit well to be considered as strong states because they can provide political goods for the welfare of their people while those that can't control their entire national territories can't obviously provide the same measure of political goods and can either be called weak, failed or collapsed states. South Sudan and C.A.R. currently occupy the positions of failed states following Rotbergs analysis. Lastly, while state control is an important determinant to overcome civil war [1] Table 3 shows that ethnic diversity, religious diversity and fractionalization are vital ingredients that can stir a repugnant bliss of armed conflicts. The C.A.R. fits well in this category because the war though involving government militia is actually between the Seleka Muslims who actually started the war and the Anti-Balaka Christian fighters who picked up arms in self defense when the Seleka rebels abused of their power by killing them indiscriminately. The bloody response of the Anti-Balaka has turned to an ethnic cleansing with the Muslim minority paying the hideous price. South Sudan is much different because, its war is independent of religious strife. However, a supposedly constitutional coup orchestrated by its incumbent president Salva Kiir is responsible for bringing the country to its knees and still kneeling [32].

While staying with the arguments of Quinn, Hechter and Wibbles above, Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner prefer to turn their look at a more econometric site [1]. They argue that 'political explanations of civil wars may trace their roots to historical grievances. Considering Table 1 above its clear that countries with a history of civil wars are likely going to have another. The C.A.R has had a series of bloody and tumultuous coups since its first president David Dacko in 1964. Since then, the country has moved from one coup to another and most times leaving many dead. Similarly, according to Table 1 it had its first civil war in 2004 which lasted till 2007. A logical premise to its current state would suggest that considering its political culture that is earmarked with violence and entrenched in blood shed having as patron the gross disregard for political institutions that can promote democracy though solid organs of democratizations, it was more likely to have another. The same is similar for South Sudan which is having its first civil war since it became an independent country in 2011. However, looking at its past as a warring people who fought northern Sudan for over fifty years to gain their independence, there is a strong correlation this study sees. Furthermore, if the civil war in South Sudan and C.A.R. have lasted this long then it means rebels have a sure flow of income which helps them maintain their operations. Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner argue that 'an important part of civil war is the finances and the army the rebels have. Furthermore, they, add that 'no profitable opportunity for violence would go unused'. This agrees with Collier and Hoeffler who say that 'rebellions arise when the opportunity for profit making presents itself'. Furthermore, regardless of the leadership of the rebel group whether its lead by a political or religious leader, so long as the chance to lay hands on Lutable resources pops up, the original intent of the rebel organization if not properly structured and directed, will experience a sudden shift in focus towards the direction of the Lutable resources. Worst case scenario occurs if the Lutable resources are found on the rebel controlled territory and the population of that territory resists them. The inevitable happens and without hesitation, the ruling government and other sympathetic nations might term them terrorists to gain more international support. Such is the case with the Anti-Balaka who despite having picked up arms to self-defense, are constantly coerced by the international community for their execs and arbitrary killings of innocent people [33]. Having promised to do all to reconcile the nation, president Ange-Faustin Tuadera merged words with action and an Anti-Balaka leader was arrested by state militia and sent to the International Criminal Court to face trial for crimes committed against humanity [19]. Hence, without money and a military that must constantly be equipped with the latest gadgets no rebellion can stand and for those who stand for years and unshaken in their resolve, the evidence is apparent. Collier, Hoeffler add that some sources of finances of rebels might come from the diaspora or from sympathetic governments. Thus, Rotberg noted that rich countries such as Saudi Arabia will almost not have a civil war due to their constant economic growth, diversification and expansion. Therefore, growth of GDP per capita is either directly or inversely proportional to any rise of civil war. More so, for as long as the economic growth of C.A.R. and South Sudan continue to regress and the population don't feel any

positive expression of the delivery of economic and political goods that can change their standards of living and hence empower them to be self-reliant, rebellions will continue to increase. In addition, for as long as state strength seen in Table 3 continues to drop, and rebels have constant and increasing access to Lutable resources such as gold, diamonds, oil and uranium, the governments of these counties will lack the audacity to exert control over their nations. It suffices to say that unless the governments of South Sudan and the C.A.R invest heavily in growing their per capita incomes and not only in counter rebel facilities that are bleeding their reserves, rebellions will remain on the rise and their presently weakened states will eventually become collapsed states. Consequently, the risk to end up in a full blown war is high for both.

EXPLAINING THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Civil war

This section will make a strong comparison between the two countries and will try to show that though South Sudan and the Central African republics suffer civil wars, the causes and intensity might be different.

South Sudan

The colonial history of South Sudan begins with the annexation of its territory by the British and then their independence in 1952. After which they joined northern Sudan which is Arabic and its citizens fairer in complexion. The South Sudanese are mostly dark in complexion and majority Christians and Animist with a small percentage of Muslims. Upon unification with northern Sudan the two states were supposed to live as one with equal rights until the majority ruling north imposed the Sharia which incited a separation between them. Since 1955 the South fought bitterly against the north until a cease fire agreement was reached in 2005 which through negotiations agreed for a referendum which would decide the fate of the South. South Sudan has borders with Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, the C.A.R. and Northern Sudan. South Sudan is a land locked country and depends entirely on the White Nile which sweeps across it. The country has high plains in the north and Center rise to Southern highlands along the border with Uganda and Kenya. I would like to mention that Uganda was a key ally in helping South Sudan in achieving its independence and unfortunately, it's the same country where its leader, John Garang died. The climate of South Sudan is seasonal with rainfall and some periods of heat. However, it also has heavy rainfalls in its south and north. The climate makes it very suitable for agriculture and possesses over 1000 km of irrigated land. Therefore, with good policies a stable and hardworking mindset, its leaders have the potential to make the country an agricultural heaven. South Sudan also has many natural resources such as hydropower, fertile agricultural lands, gold, diamond, petroleum, hardwood, limestone, iron ore, chromium ore, copper, zinc, tungsten, mica, and silver.

The war in South Sudan has been since 2013 and despite the many peace agreements between the government and the opposition nothing significant has taken place.

Some scholars accuse economic meltdown on the war as a result of the shutdown of oil production with northern Sudan while others say it's mostly ethnic.

Moschetti explains that ethnic differences between the two most principal ethnic groups that is the Dinka and Nuer started the war [34]. This has led to a sudden fractionalization of the society such that other ethnic groups have joined the war possibly in defiance to the ruling legitimacy of the incumbent president, Salva Kiir and not necessarily in support of his main opposition, Riek Machar. He continues that what started as a political tussle and a race for power between the two top statesmen suddenly broke out to ethnic violence and led to the total dissolution of the state of affairs.

More so, the state is being accused of corruption and Moschetti mentioned prominent American actor George Clooney who accused the government and some officials to have profited much thanks to the war. South Sudan is said to have over 69 tribes which are now divided due to the war.

Therefore, the cause of the war in South Sudan is mostly political but boiled down to ethnic violence because either of the political figures looked down to their kins-men for support. This agrees with Collier and Hoeffler (2004) who concluded that though ethnic diversity is not a very strong and the only determinant for civil war, it's also very potent to separate a country. Unfortunately, the ethnic violence in the war has degenerated to something else and the over five years of brutal civil war in South Sudan have left at least 382,000 people dead, according to an estimate in a new State Department-funded study.

It should be highlighted that the current war in South Sudan is not new because internal ethnic dissensions have been eroding the country before it gained its independence. Shulika and Okeke-Uzodike witnessed that "South Sudan has witnessed localized inter-ethnic conflicts, most notably arising from disputes rooted in grazing land, cattle raiding and access to natural resources" [35]. As such, the security challenges of most African countries either center on ethnic or religious troubles. As for ethnic troubles it arises from the fact that most African countries are heterogeneous and ethnic identities sometimes interfere with the genuine aims of politics and economics because the elites always fight for the interests of their tribes and not for the nation in the most times and these raise serious tensions. Most often, if not properly managed by politicians who are expected to be master engineers in the art of political practice, they may instead inflame tensions. One of the other reasons is that all tribes and ethnic groups want to make it to the top regardless of the route taken. And once one of their sons or daughters makes it to the top, the pressure exerted on him or her by her tribes men is enormous. Most often, the latter might end up trying to serve them instead of serving the nation. And in trying to please their tribes, they deliberately step on the toes of other tribes who also expect to be served well or if they won't be served, then someone from their tribe must also be given the position so that they too can have their share of the national cake.

South Sudan which is also heterogeneous like many other African states finds itself within the fault lines of this ethnic conflict and just like Nigeria where the Hausa and Fulani herdsmen are attacking and killing Christians because of grazing land, South Sudan shares the same cause and effect. It seems that the ethnic tensions that had been raging below the ladder somewhat found themselves up the ladder and where picked up by the top government administrators in the persons of the incumbent president and his vice president and opposition who decided to put ethnic lines first instead of the nation first. A stroll through some of the civil wars in Africa might not be far from the truth. As a matter of fact, conflicts in Somalia, Nigeria, Congo Republic, Burundi, and Liberia though maybe overlaid by other rhetoric are savagely rooted in ethnic disparities and marketed by their most prominent proponents who fought for the central stage in either the economic, political and social spheres. In addition, interethnic and intra-ethnic relationships are often clouded by incompatible interests; inequitable access to political space, economic and other opportunities; and intergroup identity competition [35]. How to overcome these ethnic problems whose unanimity will not only bring glory to the nation which will loudly and proudly call itself unity in diversity, but will also increase its cultural heritage and make it a touristic hob remains a swampy snare.

Seeing that South Sudan has suffered generations of ethnic tensions, it's left to see what the government has to do to not only to solve the problem but also to find a lasting solution for the current social fractionalization. More so, it will be good to adopt policies that will fill in the gaps, and reduce the continuous armament of ethnic groups who see guns as the only way to maintain their status quo. Though practicing politics in Africa is very difficult because all ethnic groups must be represented in the government at least to some degree, it's worth highlighting that the majority and most prominent ethnic groups as a way of limiting ethnic tensions, must make concessions, and practice meritocracy instead of relinquishing all major positions to tribe's men as Bayart mentioned "it's our time to chop".

The Central African Republic

The Central African Republic is a former French colony situated in the trigger point of Africa. It gained its independence from France in 1960 and shortly after having elected its first president, David Dacko, he was ousted in a French backed military coup. The country has a population of 4.659 million but with the hundreds of thousands dead in its six year civil war, it's not sure if the numbers can be directly told now. As opposed to South Sudan the C.A.R has over 10 sq.km of irrigated land, meaning its land is not suitable for agriculture. More so it has an agriculturally unfriendly climate which is mostly tropical that is hot and dry. This surely explains why it almost entirely depends on Cameroon for feeding. The country is land locked and borders Cameroon, Chad, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Congo Republic. The geography of the country largely favours the rebellions and accounts for the success the Michel Djotodia former Seleka rebel leader led to oust Francois Bozize from power. The latter had taken advantage of the flat rolling plateaus scattered hills in the

northeast somewhere along its 1.556 km border with Chad where it recruited and trained both Sudanese and Chadian mercenaries. The C.A.R has only 8.1% of agricultural land though the country is cursed with unthinkable natural resources such as diamonds, uranium, timber, gold, oil and hydropower.

When the war broke out in 2013 shortly after the Libreville agreements, it was simply a political issue that had a religious agenda. Michel Djotodia is said to have persistently promised to take revenge on Christians who had supposedly marginalized the minority Muslim north for decades. Unfortunately, his revenge wasn't well conceived and it instead threw the country to where it is today. Today, there is ethnic cleansing taking place in the country and those who suffer the most are Muslims. About 2.5 million people need humanitarian aid, over six hundred thousand displaced, more than five thousand dead and over two hundred and eighty thousand refugees to neighboring countries [36].

The similarity of these two wars is that both were started by politicians who used their political powers to gather popular support. Both have had more than 1000 battle deaths which qualify them to be in a civil war according to Collier and Hoeffler. Both have a strong need of humanitarian aid and have exported hundreds of thousands of refugees abroad [37].

The difference is that in South Sudan, the ethnic privilege of both the ruling president and his opposition claims the spoil and this has led to wide scale violence in the entire country with different ethnic groups organizing vigilante or resistance rebel groups to protect their status quo. Secondly, South Sudan has had more negotiations than the C.A.R in its five year war. Unfortunately, nothing much has happened [38]. The C.A.R on the other hand has struggled to elect a democratic president despite the on-going war while South Sudan still has the same man in power since 2011 a reason to escalate the war. The CAR has serious economic issues and coupled with the fact that its land is not agriculturally friendly, it depends more on its natural resources which are on the reach of rebel forces in need of finances to stay alive. The war in the C.A.R is more of religious than ethnic as it is in South Sudan. The Muslim minority in South Sudan are not the target of either rebel or government forces rather it's who agrees with each of the politicians that is targeted. Whereas in the C.A.R. it's the Muslim minority that suffers the most.

CONCLUSION

This study is proud to conclude that its hypothesis was proven right that polarization either in government, political party, ethnic groups causes tensions which lead to its dependent variable which is civil war. Having studied the independent variables carefully, this study sees a direct link between the independent variables and the dependent variable to cause civil war.

REFERENCES

1. Quinn K, Hetcher M, Wibbles E. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War Revisited. University of Washington. 2003;pp:2-19.

2. Ngoh VJ. The Political Evolution of Cameroon, 1884-1961. Dissertations and Theses. 1979.
3. Melber H. Populism as politics in Southern Africa. 2018.
4. Messara M. How populism can be turned into an opportunity, not a threat. The Conversation. 2018.
5. Darnolf S, Laakso L. Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe From Liberation to Authoritarianism. Palgrave Macmillan. 2003.
6. Ngoepe K. ANC will rule until Jesus comes, Zuma says again. news24. 2016.
7. Elischer S. (Rev): Terretta, Meredith: Nation of outlaws, state of violence: nationalism, grassfields tradition, and state building in Cameroon. Athens: Ohio University Press, In: Africa Spectrum. 2015;50:107-109.
8. The Telegraph. Robert Mugabe says 'only God' can remove him. 2008.
9. Rechniewski E. A Small War in Cameroon: looking back on the events of 1955-64. University of Sydney. 2014.
10. Takougang J. The Union des populations du Cameroun and its Southern Cameroons connection. Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer, tome 83, n°310, 1er trimestre. 1996;pp:7-24.
11. Zanoletti A. Ambazonian separatists in Cameroon. ACLED. 2003.
12. Pera RJ. Cameroon's Anglophone crisis worsens and widens. Ida Africa watch. 2018;pp:1-5.
13. Nyamnjoh FB, Konnings P. The Anglophone Problem of Cameroon. The Journal of Modern African Studies. 1997;35:207-229.
14. Balla NFA, Shephard B. The Cameroon Anglophone Crisis: Examining Escalation and Seeking Solutions. Chattam House The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 2017;pp:2-5.
15. Katz A. The Muslims of the Central African Republic Face a Deadly Purge. Time. 2014.
16. Abdel-Raheem T. Killing of John Garang: Who did it? Pambazuka News. 2007.
17. Bryson D. ANC suspends Julius Malema. Independent. 2011.
18. Zittel T. The Dark and Bright Sides of Party Polarization. Items. 2018.
19. Worldwide Movement for Human Rights. In the Central African Republic, an antibalaka leader transferred to the International Criminal Court: new momentum in the fight against impunity? Fidh. 2018.
20. World Remitt. Cameroon: Remittances 300mln in 2018. Business in rose to about \$ Cameroon. 2019.
21. Sama E. Money transfers from the diaspora to Cameroon hits 1.2 billion dollars. Cameroon Concord News. 2016.
22. Conciliation Resources. Briefing: Crisis in the Central African Republic. 2013;pp:1-6.
23. Koura B, Eckel M. In Central African Republic, Diamonds Fuel A Cycle of Violence and Poverty. VOA.
24. Flanagan J. The blood diamond trade is tearing the Central African Republic apart. Quatz. 2015.
25. Fischer M. 6 crazy facts about the rebel leader who just took over the Central African Republic. The Washington Post. 2013.
26. Fearon JD, Laitin DD. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and civil war. Department of Political Science Stanford University. 2015;pp:8.
27. Yei I. South Sudan struggles to meet demand for education. IRIN. 2012.
28. World Atlas. Central African Republic-Adult (15+) literacy rate. Knoema. 2016.
29. Joselow G. Population Under Pressure in South Sudan Opposition Territory. VOA. 2015.
30. Neves G. Timor-Leste Finally Has a Government. Now What? The Diplomat. 2018.
31. Index of Economic Freedom. Kosovo. 2019.
32. Sudan Tribune. South Sudan's Taban rejects stepping down of Salva Kiir from power. 2018.
33. Daily Sabah. Christian anti-Balaka militants kill 25 worshippers in mosque in Central African Republic. 2017.
34. Moschetti D. A brief history of the civil war in South Sudan. 2018.
35. Shulika LS, Okeke-Uzodike N. Inter-ethnic conflict in south Sudan: A challenge to peace. Research Gate. 2016;pp:1-8.
36. Noel K. Understanding the Roots of Conflict in South Sudan. Council on Foreign Relations. 2016.
37. Barger M, McCarty N. Causes and Consequences of Polarization. The American Political Science Association. 2017;pp:19-46.
38. <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2018/282760.html>