

India's strategic interest in SAARC countries: Soft power approach

Pooja Raghav^{1*}, Trishna Rai¹

¹Doctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science, Madras University/ Madras Christian College, India

ABSTRACT

South Asia is an eccentric region defaced by inter-state provocation, various disputes and several absurdities. The paper is based on the multi-dimensional approach by collecting data and analysing it from various viewpoints. This includes primary sources such as bilateral treaties, official reports, letters and speech of political leaders. For the secondary source research papers, reports, peer-reviewed journal articles and books were also consulted. The later part of the paper is organised as follows: Section two will give an overview of the conceptual framework of the soft power and transition of power in India's foreign policy towards other South Asian Countries. Section three will assess India's foreign policy towards other South Asian countries before the establishment of SAARC. Part four focuses on India's stand after the establishment of SAARC. Further, the future aspects of SAARC are discussed, followed by the Conclusion.

Keywords: Soft power, India, foreign policy, South Asia

INTRODUCTION

South Asia is an eccentric region defaced by inter-state provocation, various disputes and several absurdities. India, despite being a dominant nation in South Asia in every possible parameter from territory to population, economy to the military, has paradoxically not got the privileged position in the region. Indian strategists are still admiring how to get genuinely acceptable leadership. SAARC activities have always remained frustratingly sluggish ever since its existence. Despite signing numerous agreements, SAARC has hardly produced any remarkable outcome. During the decade of establishment of SAARC, the use of hard power was a common approach in India's foreign policy towards South Asian nations. During 1970s India's military build-up because of East Pakistan crises, in 1983-1990 India's intervention in Sri Lanka and economic pressure imposed on Nepal in 1989 are the separate instances of hard power imposed by India. The changes in India's foreign policy since the 1990s have intensified the debate about her future status in the international system (Cohen 2001, Mohan 2003). From the beginning of the 21st Century, India is using more soft power strategies towards SAARC nations to improve its stand. This paper examines transition in India's foreign policy from hard power to soft power strategies towards the South

Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations to improve its stand in the prosperous region. The greater cohesion can be achieved among the SAARC nations through the possibility of soft power. The most crucial determinant in this era is science and technology, which can change the multilateral relations amongst the SAARC nations. India being the primary centre for IT developments can foster this as a profession in the region.

India is the heart of the South Asian nations, sharing its permeable borders with Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and water boundaries with Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Therefore it is strategically vital for India to maintain balance with all of these nations in case a military confrontation. It has been noticed over the past decades that India's foreign policy had focused on the country's cultural and political values. Liberal institutions and welfare-oriented policies are essential instruments of its soft power. India's soft power is aimed at fostering regional cooperation and solidarity achieved through a holistic approach encompassing a benign foreign policy, promotion of economic interdependence, strong cultural cooperation and foreign assistance (Kugiel, 2012). Amidst the above-given parameters, the counter efforts of China to Indian attempts cannot be ignored. The analysis is done on how to achieve a multilateral approach from bilateral strategies.

*Correspondence to: Pooja Raghav, Doctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science, Madras University/ Madras Christian College, India, Tel: 9711757887, E-mail: pooja.raghav1993@gmail.com, trishnarai73@gmail.com

Received: August 27, 2020; **Accepted:** September 14, 2021; **Published:** September 24, 2021

Citation: Raghav P (2021) India's strategic interest in SAARC countries: Soft power approach. J Pol Sci Pub Aff. 9:p216

Copyright: © 2021 Raghav P. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

This paper is based on the multi-dimensional approach by collecting data and analysing it from various viewpoints. Both print and online sources were consulted during the research process. This includes primary sources such as bilateral treaties, official reports, letters and speech of political leaders. For the secondary source research papers, reports, peer-reviewed journal articles and books were also consulted. The later part of the paper is organised as follows: Section two will give an overview of the conceptual framework of the soft power and transition of power in India's foreign policy towards other South Asian Countries. Section three will assess India's foreign policy towards other South Asian countries before the establishment of SAARC. Part four focuses on India's stand after the establishment of SAARC. Further, the future aspects of SAARC are discussed, followed by the Conclusion.

Conceptual framework of soft power in India's foreign policy

Neo-realist school of thought defines the importance of regional powers in analysing various approaches of international relations. The idea of Neo-realists who emphasised on military and economic factors might have been unsuccessful in the post-cold war era. The Neo-realist approaches focus on the hard power on the position of the state, especially in terms of their military capabilities and economic strength. Those enable regional powers to influence their neighbours and to protect themselves from disagreeable outside interference (Waltz 1979: 191/192). On disparity, liberal institutional approaches have emphasised soft power aspects with cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions as the primary resources (Nye 1990: 167). The soft power concept of a neo-liberal scholar, Joseph Nye (1990), shaped the foreign policy of the majority of nations. Soft power depends on the capability of manipulation, to prioritise and convince on your reality. Initially, the concept of soft power was mainly based on the sources as given by (Nye, 2004, p. 11): 'its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad) and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)'. 'Soft Power', as defined by Joseph Nye, rests on the ability of a country to represent its foreign policy motives, attractively enough for its counterparts to accept them and thus eliminates the use of coercion. Over some time, the concept of soft power has increased its horizon.

According to American Journalist, (Joshua Kurlantzick, 2007) soft power is not only limited to military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers, like aid and investment and participation in multilateral organisations. The best example of this is when India in the 1960s provided technical assistance and training to developing nations during the critical famine and widespread starvation. The Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme were offered to civil servants from developing countries to get training in India. This programme indeed has strengthened India's relations with recipient nations. Subsequently, Afghanistan's former president Hamid Karzai enjoyed warmer relations with India after attending the programme.

Globalisation and economic liberalisation after 1991 added another component in Indian foreign policy both on the International and the regional level. It leads to cross-connections, non-state actors influence, democratic regimes, accentuation of diplomacy, the most conspicuous form of soft power was displayed with immense significance in the international system. A country like India, having a considerable amount of soft power can be seen as more legitimate. Other South Asian nations can comply with their objectives. From Nehruvian idealism to realpolitik to soft power transition in Indian policy can be seen. After the post-cold war epoch, the question of military power became unrealistic in International affairs.

In 2010, India had signed an agreement of 1 billion credit deal with Bangladesh for the advancement of 14 infrastructure projects primarily in the communication services. This deal was signed between Exim Bank of India and the Economic Relations Department of Bangladesh. India has altered its concept of foreign policy by making a "coherent effort...to raise India's image and brand value in foreign countries." The evolution was highly classified, but it was known to all that power was being redefined. Harsh Pant remarks on it that "under Prime Minister Modi, India is taking a strategic approach towards using its soft-power resources to enhance the nation's image abroad." The conduct of soft power is intricately linked to the practice of public diplomacy. The basic idea of Public diplomacy is when the government tries for the promotion of national interest generally by public sentiments of both the host and the target country. Public diplomacy gained its momentum in protecting a nation's foreign policy with the increase in global interdependence and integration. Traditionally public diplomacy meant diplomatic relations amongst the government officials, but this definition has evolved with time. Today public diplomacy incorporates ideas and interaction of both governmental and non-governmental organisations that include inter and intrastate diplomacy to incorporate variations of cultures and enhance relationships which further influence ideas for the advancement of their values. By appealing to the public, encouraging outcomes via soft power could undeniably be included through the arena of new public diplomacy.

The conduct of soft power is also intrinsically linked to Information technology. Information technology has become inalienable art of every country foreign policy formulation. Countries trajectory can be developed with science and technology. As compared to the developed nations, South Asian countries are still lagging in science and technology. However, from the second half of the 20th century successive amount of programmes in the IT sector has been instigated. Information technology in general terms is all about creation, manipulation, using a different kind of software and hardware system. Computers and communication technology can be significantly used to improve multilateral relations in the South Asian region. In the age of information and advancement of technology, with free movement of people, capital and ideas, it is claimed that communication strategies become more critical, and outcomes are shaped not merely by whose army wins, but also by whose story wins (Nye, 201, p.18).

India's foreign policy towards SAARC nations: Before the existence of SAARC

In 1600 the royal charter to the East India Company was given by Queen Elizabeth I for trade purposes. For the next hundred years, the East India Company became the most persuasive power in South Asia as the successors after the Aurangzeb was weak. In 1768 Maharajadhiraja Prithvi Narayan Shah, the last ruler of the Gorkha Kingdom conquered Kathmandu and become the first ruler of the Kingdom of Nepal. In the Southern part of the South Asian region, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) became a British Colony in 1802. Then the first Anglo-Afghan War between the British East India Company and the Emirates of Afghanistan between 1838-1842 and led to the withdrawal of British forces from Afghanistan. Straight after the Indian sepoy mutiny, India came under the direct rule of the Britishers in 1858. The power of the East India Company was being transferred to the British Crown. In the second Anglo-Afghan war, British gains control of Afghan foreign affairs and in the Third Anglo-Afghan happened in 1919, Afghanistan being recognised as an independent country by the British. Even before independence, there was a desire to 'self' amidst the now Independent nations. Indian leadership back then also had a vision of world peace and Afro-Asian unity. The then government, the Indian National Congress (INC) inclined towards the formation of a congregation by assimilating the anti-imperial feelings. Therefore, in its Bombay session of 1921 resolved on the resolution, 'to promote feelings of amity and concord with neighbouring states to establish goodwill and sympathy to formulate a clear and definite foreign policy of India' (A.M. Zaidi, 1987). For congress, anti-imperialism was the standing pillar of its foreign policy and expected nations throughout Asia to partake on its theory. According to the INC, any nation in bondage would always question the sovereignty of all the other nations (The Encyclopedia of the Indian National Congress, 1981). Pursuing the idea of an Eastern- Federation Congress discussed political ideas that scaled the ramparts of the Himalayas and most of the surrounding seas to recognise that the freedom of Asiatic nations would contemplate the organisation of an Eastern- Federation (Mohamad Ali, 1923). The agenda of regional cooperation and unity in Asia aggravated when INC nursed a sense of grievance for India not securing a position as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations. In July 1945 Congress Working Committee (CWC) adopted a firm resolution to express their resentment to allotment of position to the smaller nations in UN Organisation. The Great Power not only wholly controlled and dominated the new organisation but was placed above the law they had framed themselves. Henceforth, India realised to attain the status of a sovereign state and an independent position to contribute to the maintenance of peace, security and freedom. In 1947 British India was partitioned into two countries as India and Pakistan with the sparkling communal clashes which continue even now over the status of Jammu and Kashmir. Srilanka gained independence in 1948. Following the adoption of the new Indian Constitution in 1950, India signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship drawing the framework of future bilateral relations. After Indian independence, Indian foreign policy generally had three phases and approaches: The Nehru

period, the Indira-doctrine and the Gujral-doctrine (Christan Wagner, 2005). Although Nehru formulated the concept of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, it was not automatically used in the relations with the neighbours (Maxwell 1970: 78-80).

Nehru had a very deferential approach in India's bilateral relations not necessarily in the regional respective. Jawaharlal Nehru mentioned that small states do not have any future, and they will be reduced to the status of the satellite states only. Hereafter, he advocated the creation of a South Asian Federation of India, Iraq, Afghanistan and Burma (J.S. Bright, 1950). However, the primary reason for the regional cooperation for India was the issue of 'trade'. Still, it not clearly defined whether a trade is to be considered as an element of hard power or soft powers. However, in the initial process, trade was not considered due to the fear that a liberal trade regime would work for the benefits of India. India suggested a carefully balanced inter- dependence in the regional cooperation in South Asia with an equal division of labour in order to strengthen economic base and infrastructure.

Indira Gandhi used a more coherent concept of regional policies. Domestic conflicts should only be solved with the help of India and not by the interference of outside powers or international organisations (Hagerty 1991). Furthermore, India intervened, for instance, in Sri Lanka in 1971 and 1987 to 1990 and the Maldives 1988. During Indira Gandhi era, Indian foreign policy was shaped more by hard power strategies than by soft power approaches. Amidst the India Gandhi era and Gujral doctrine, the entire structure came into being to coordinate and monitor the implementation of SAARC activities in 1987. The third era of foreign policy under Prime Minister Gujral and establishment of SAARC is explained in the next section of the paper.

India's foreign policy towards SAARC nations: the modern context

Bangladesh then-president Zia-Ur Rahman first initiated the idea of closer regional cooperation in the late 1970s. In 1985, despite all the bilateral tensions, SAARC came into existence. SAARC established with a goal of collaboration in the social, economic, cultural, scientific and technical fields. Their main objective was socio-economic welfare and cultural development. It also included the provisions that the decisions had to be taken unanimously and contentious issues were to be kept out of the organisation. The Secretariat with Security General, seven Directors and General Services Staff was mentioned in the Charter. Until the 1990s the progress of SAARC was just decent. An essential part of SAARC was the annual summits as they could be considered as a mode of confidence-building measure for the member states. After the advent of liberalisation in 1991 SAARC got momentum through economic cooperation. The policy of economic reforms, exports promotion was also followed by all South Asian countries. SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) was established in 1995 to look into the prospects of regional economic collaboration. However, due to the lack of complementarity and structural constraints, the intra-regional trade remained only two to three per cent. In order to further improve the trade in the South Asian region,

SAARC Free Trade Arrangement (SAFTA) was signed in Islamabad in January 2004. SAFTA aimed to have free intra-regional trade in South Asia from 2006 in order to bring the economic alternation in less developed economies Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal.

It seems that the idea of Gujral doctrine of the 1990s and economic cooperation produce an outright gain for all players was circumstantial. The foreign policy under the doctrine of then Prime Minister Gujral was the principle of no reciprocity, emphasising that India not only had a more significant responsibility but also should give more to the smaller neighbours than she would receive. He reflected the domestic changes, especially liberalisation after 1991. South Asia did not figure very prominently in the BJP's concept of the extended neighbourhood after 1998 (Singh 2001). BJP with the South Asian region mainly followed the policies of its predecessors of focusing on the West, Central and Southeast Asia. However, the focus on SAARC nations was back in 2004 after the electoral victory of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) under the leadership of the Congress Party. In February 2005 foreign secretary Shyam Saran and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh tied up more explicitly to the Gujral doctrine and stressed the need for increased economic relations and promoted the idea of partnership with the neighbours. They also underlined that the promotion of democracy would not be a tool in India's relations with her neighbours (Mohan 2005). India's South Asian overview shows the fundamental conceptual shifts in certainly curtailed and compressed way. The debate about the interference in other nations and threats which are still existent is taken in the next section.

During the formative years (1985-1990) progress was comparatively slow with five meetings. India's chasing dream of a larger role beyond the geographical border manifested it with the policy of non-alignment. India became the most significant features of SAARC because of centrality, size and potential of power. Nevertheless, India also faced deep uncertainties to the small countries particularly Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka about her objectives because of a yearning global role after a vast industrial infrastructure, a strong military, massive technological and scientific human resources and stable democracy relatively. With the Indo-centrality 'baggage' SAARC had a meek start by adopting a Charter in 1985 Dhaka Summit. During this period India pursued her objective on trade and cultural cooperation in SAARC and continuously excommunicated contentious and divisive politics in SAARC. India, in the Fourth Summit, demonstrated its frustration over the crawling speed of cooperation and coordination in aspects of the economy. Then-Prime Minister of India clearly said it in his statement:

"We also need to strengthen linkages between ourselves to give us strength, individually and as a region. This call for increased economic exchanges within our region, covering the gamut of economic activities from agriculture to industry infrastructure, technology and human resource development Economic cooperation must lie at the heart of regional cooperation. There has to be a degree of harmonisation to ensure that complementarities in our economics are matched to give

strength to our respective economies and strength to our voice and influence in world forums.

However, we shy away from trade and economic cooperation (Gandhi. R, 1988). Still, Pakistan and Bangladesh opposed the inclusion of 'trade' in the cooperation areas. In 1989, due to India's withdrawal of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), Sri Lanka refused to host SAARC Summit. That was the first test for the Indian approach of encasing SAARC from disputed bilateral issues. The SAARC process pulled through crossroad, and the Summit congregation was hosted in Male in the Maldives in 1990 after the pullout of IPKF from Sri Lanka as stated by (Muralidharan, S, 1999) that the new focus on economic cooperation became evident in the everyday activities of both countries within the SAARC and in the bilateral Free Trade Agreement that was signed in 1998. The disintegration of USSR and the end of the cold war led to a paradigm shift in international relations. Economist and political scientist pointed out that with the cold-war coming to an end the 'geo-politics' primarily got transformed into 'geo-economics' or aggressive areas of non-interference and free trade (Indra Nath Mukerji, 2000).

With the advent of globalisation, India in 1991 declared an alteration in her economic policy allotment to coincide her approach with international marketisation. Other SAARC member countries also undertook the process of policy alteration to establish their markets for the entire world. During this epoch, remarkable political changes were witnessed in South Asia too. Like the re-establishment of representative democracy in Pakistan (1988), democratic movements in Nepal (1990), and Bangladesh (1991). It truly did bring significant constructive aspirations for regional cooperation. Since mid-1990s India's public diplomacy was primarily determined by the Gujral Doctrine. The doctrine firmly adhered to sovereign equality, non-reciprocal and non-interference magnanimity. Due to its strategic locations and national concerns, India has been more acceptable to adopt the policy of soft power approach, especially towards its immediate neighbours. Its diplomatic arrangement is more highlighted with the incorporation of soft power. If we examine India's strategic association in past relations in the last ten years, two events get highlighted. One, Narendra Modi was becoming the Prime Minister in 2014 and the Uri attack that took place in Kashmir, on 18 September 2016, which altered power dynamics and also the switch of strategy in dealing with the SAARC nations altogether. Henceforth it is essential to understand India's strategic interest. However, South Asian Region has always been in a conflictual relationship between India and its neighbours. Other South Asian countries always had that suspecting mindset towards India's objectives in the region.

On the other hand, India feels genuine security concerns, particularly with Pakistan. The most significant negative factor which retards the SAARC process is the asymmetry between India and other SAARC nations. India's relation with Pakistan deteriorated even further after the Kargil war because of escalation in cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. During the same time, an Indian Airplane to Kandhar (Afghanistan) through Lahore was hijacked in Pakistan. India's

foreign policy towards Pakistan and Afghanistan is mainly dependent on its national security and counter-terrorism. India and Pakistan relations primarily involves national security in terms of Kashmir dispute and secondly on hydro-diplomacy. By focusing on the various political, socio-cultural and economic factors, the link between the national interest and policy formulation can be understood. Hydro-Diplomacy has become a global phenomenon due to the increasing instance of water scarcity. Turkey decreasing the outflow of water in the Euphrates and also with Palestine's water supply being snipped off by Israel is some of the few examples of how countries are using water as a weapon to facilitate personal tactical affairs and political ultimatum. Likewise, is the Indus Water Treaty signed by Pakistan and India in 1960 significantly pointed out the necessity of collaboration among the two nations on water allocations for the wellbeing of their agricultural economies. Indus valley treaty assimilated the national governments, experts and also conflict resolution bodies for obvious reasons. However, again in 1971, Bangladesh seceded from Islamabad; relations became a cause for concern for five decades. "Nuclear crises", 2002 and the daring insurgent strike in Mumbai, December of 2008 only to add fuel to the fire.

India always quests to boost its capacity building and economic growth through greater regional cooperation in SAARC countries. If we take the case of Afghanistan, its geostrategic position connects South Asia and mineral and abundant oil parts of Central and West Asia. This consciousness ushered India to firmly stand up for Afghanistan's permanent membership in SAARC in 2007. India shares strong cultural and historical links with Afghanistan ever since Agreement on Cultural Relations in 1963 to the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2011. India's diplomatic advancement in attaining these goals focuses on the belief of the principles of peaceful co-existence and regional accord.

Future aspects of it in India's foreign policy towards SAARC nations: scope and organisation

Some critics think that the relevance of SAARC is almost negligible when it comes to reducing tensions, advancing regional reliability and encouraging economic prosperity. India is persistent in its efforts to appease the strategic branching amid the SAARC countries via social-cultural and economic cooperation. To tackle problems between SAARC nations, India can rely on soft power capabilities. Indian policy should be framed to smooth the political and strategic factors in the region. The bilateral tension between India and Pakistan has subsequently reduced in the post-cold war. Nevertheless, we can also raise a question of whether soft power can bring silver lining on the horizon for Indian-Pakistan relations. There is enormous potential energy for changing the status quo. The idea of regionalism can only be, India being a prime-mover in convincing her neighbours. India, as SAARC nations, cannot rely on plans to concentrate on bilateral relations alone. Indian foreign policy has not shown any significant shift in its policy to change the issue of bilateral disputes. Most of the studies do not discuss the impact of recent developments of the economic rise of India and democratic transitions in many SAARC nations.

A gradual change in India's relationship with other SAARC nations has been seen after India's economic growth. A trade which is one debatable topic whether it should be considered in soft or hard power. The liberalisation of trade at the regional level would significantly contribute to economic growth and development at the national level. Trade not only facilitates lower prices and an increase in consumer choice but also promotes civil liberties and political rights. New ideas, science and technology and tools can be transmitted through trade. Regional trade liberalisation can foster twin goals of development and democratic consolidation of SAARC countries. Many experts have noted that India's advancing alliance with the United States has made it more assertive and less susceptible in the use of the coercive technique to address regional issues (Cartwright 2009; Jain 2010; Kapur and Ganguly 2007; Mitra 2009). India is cautiously welcoming the presence of the US in the South Asian region because of growing Chinese influence in the region. Both India and China strive to influence their neighbours in terms of strategic importance.

CONCLUSION

This paper traces the evolution of India's foreign policy primarily on the SAARC nations and has concluded with these observations. First, the practice of hard power strategy from the 1970s to 1980s created a deep mistrust towards India. Secondly, India's relation with neighbouring nations was perceived primarily of security and foreign focus, political and economic was considered secondary. However, it declares that in the last 20 years, India probably has initiated a large number of soft power tactics, and has brought some constructive results in its regional policy. Therefore if it carries on with this strategy in the nearing future and addresses the flaws in its policy, it can retrieve the identity of a well-founded and commendable regional leader. One cannot deny that India has also faced significant criticism in the practice of soft power. As India's sabotaged, the summit conference of SAARC, which was planned in Pakistan in November 2016 was considered as an apparent deviation from its path of peace, prosperity and stability in the region. South Asian Countries are perhaps practising soft diplomacy. They have to prevent future crises via upbeat and forthcoming attitudes. The new political imperative may be the first step. It remains to be seen in how far India's 'positive unilateralism'⁸ will create a better regional framework or in how far the growing outside interference will bring about a shift towards multilateralism in India's regional policy.

REFERENCES

1. Bright, J. S. Before and After Independence: A Collection of the Most Important and Soul-Stirring Speeches Delivered by Jawaharlal Nehru. (1950), Vol.I: India's Struggle for Independence, 1922-1946.
2. Goel, O. P. (Ed.). India and SAARC Engagements (2004), (Vol. 2). Gyan Publishing House.
3. Gujral, I.K., A Foreign Policy for India, 1998.
4. Gupta, S. India and regional integration in Asia. Asia Publishing House, (1964).
5. Hagerty, Devin T., 'India's Regional Security Doctrine', in: Asian Survey, 31 (April 1991) 4, 351-363.

6. Indian National Congress, & Zaidi, A. M. INC, the Glorious Tradition: Texts of the Resolutions Passed by the INC, the AICC, and the CWC. Indian Institute of Applied Political Research, (1987)
7. Larson, D. W. New perspectives on rising powers and global governance: Status and clubs. *International studies review*, (2018), 20, 247-254.
8. Maxwell, Neville, India's China War, New York 1970.
9. Mazumdar, A. Indian foreign policy in transition: relations with South Asia. Routledge, (2014).
10. Muni, S. D. SARC: Building Regionalism from below. *Asian Survey*, (1985), 25, 391-404.
11. Mohan, C. Raja, India's positive unilateralism, in: *The Hindu*, 27. October 2003.
12. Mohan, Raja C., The Manmohan Doctrine, in: *Daily Times*, 28 February, 2005
13. Morgenthau, H. J., Thompson, K. W., & Clinton, W. D. *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*, (1985).
14. Mukherji, I. N. Indo-Sri Lankan Trade and Investment Linkages: With Special Reference to SAPTA and Free Trade Agreement. *South Asia Economic Journal*, (2000), 1, 53-77.
15. Muni, S. D. SARC: Building Regionalism from below. *Asian Survey*, (1985), 25(4), 391-404.