Domestic Radicalisation in Kenya

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Abstract

Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia on October 14, 2011, was in pursuit of Al-Shabaab, the Al-Qaeda linked Somali terrorist cell group that had abducted foreign aid workers and tourists in Kenya. Since (KDF) October preemptive and preventive attack in Somalia, Al-Shabaab terrorists have executed a number of violent attacks in Kenyan territory like in Westgate mall in Nairobi in September 2013, in which 67 people were killed, Mpeketoni and Poromoko villages of Lamu County on June 16 and 17, where more than 60 people were butchered in cold blood, Mandera on 22 November 2014 in which 28 bus passengers were shot dead for not being able to recite the Koran, in Mandera again on Dec 2, 2014, where 36 quarry workers were killed and Garissa University College and taken responsibility. After the Garissa University College terror attack where 148 people were killed on 2 April, 2015, it has become crystal clear that Kenya has a domestic radicalization problem of its own. Kenyan nationals have conducted a number of recent terrorist attacks in Kenya, with many of them receiving military training from Al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia. Radical clerics in mosques in Coast counties, North Eastern counties and Nairobi County, have recruited youths in Kenya for militancy. This is a desk top research, where we give details of recent terrorist attacks in Kenya and also identifies the factors behind the radicalisation of youths in Kenya.

Keywords: Terrorism, Domestic and Radicalization

Introduction

In mid October 14, 2011, the Kenyan government announced that it was deploying Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) to Somalia in pursuit of Al-Shabaab for preemptive and preventive incursion, the Al-Qaeda linked Somali terrorist group that had abducted tourists, foreign aid workers and some Kenyans from Wajir and Mandera in Kenya. Since Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) October incursion, in Somalia, the Al-Shabaab terrorist group has executed a number of terrorist attacks in Kenya. The inial retaliation attacks in late 2011 and early 2012 by Al-Shabaab against Kenyans were done by Somalis from Somalia and their sympathisers from outside Africa. The later attacks has involved foreign and Kenyans terrorists. This clearly demonstrates that some Kenyans have been radicalised and joined the terrorist group. These radicalised Kenyan nationals have conducted a number of recent terrorist attacks in Kenya, with many of them receiving military training from Al-Shabaab in neighboring Somalia (Associated Press, 2012).

Radical muslims clerics in mosques in counties like Garissa, Wajir, Mandera in former North Eastern provinces and counties as Mombasa,Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River and Lamu in former Coast province and Nairobi county have recruited young Kenyans to join Al-Shabaab training in Somalia. It is estimated that 80% of Kenyans are Christians while Muslims accounts for about 9-10% of the population and are largely concentrated in former North Eastern province and in former Coast province that border with Somalia (United States of America Central Intelligence Agency, 2012).

Methodology

This is a desk top research, this being a sensitive research topic, analysis of secondary data was done and in this respect, desk top, library research was done, where journals, internet, newspapers, books, and reports were consulted and studied. Secondary analysis allows for the examination of existing data yet can produce new and more detailed information, including the emergence of conclusions that differ to those in the original report (Orodo, 2005). The advantages of secondary analysis are that it is high quality data (Bryman, 2004) an additional strength of secondary analysis is quick and easy access to materials as documentary research is largely free of the restrictions and difficulties faced in primary data research, the researchers do not encounter rejection, non-response, bias, or any other respondentbased problems (Sarantakos, 2005).

Precedence of Terrorist Attacks in Kenya

In the recent past, Kenya has been victim of terrorist attacks (Odhiambo et al, 2013). Some of the major attacks are: The August 7, 1998, when al-Qu’ida attacked the United States of America Embassy in Nairobi, killing 213 people (Los Angeles Times, 1998). The attack was happened simultaneously with the bombing of the United States of America Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed 12 people (Ibid). On November 28, 2002, Al-Qaeda militants attacked the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 people (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2002). Almost simultaneously, the terrorists fired two shoulder-launched missiles at an Israeli charter plane taking off from Moi International Airport, Mombasa, narrowly missing the plane (Ibid).

According to Al-Shabaab terror group, the escalation of its attacks in Kenya is as result of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia. On October 1, 2011, Dedieu, Marie, a 66-year-old differently abled French woman, was kidnapped from her home near Kenya’s Manda Island by suspected Al-Shabaab terrorist group (Rice and Willsher, 2011). She died while in their custody that same month (Ibid). On October 13, suspected Al-Shabaab terror group
kidnapped two female Spanish Médecins sans Frontières aid workers from the Dadaab refugee camp in Garissa County, Kenya, and took them to Somalia (Rice and Willsher, 2011). This series of trans-border attacks, as well as earlier kidnapping incidents, spurred Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia on October 14 for preemptive and preventive purposes (Gettleman, 2011).

After Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia, Al-Shabaab terror group warned that it would retaliate by attacking Kenya. The first incident targeting Kenyans in post Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia occurred on October 24, 2011, when Al-Shabaab terror group member hurled a grenade into the Mwaura public house (pub) on Mfangano Street in Nairobi, wounding 12 people (Wabala, 2011). Later that day, another grenade attack targeted Machakos bus terminal in Nairobi, killing one person (The Star, 2011). On November 5, terrorists hurled two grenades at the East Africa Pentecostal Church in Garissa, killing two people (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2011).

Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks on churches escalated in 2012. In one incident, on September 30, 2012, Al-Shabaab terrorist hurled a grenade into a Church Sunday School Children Service at the St. Polycarp’s Anglican Church in the Eastleigh area in Nairobi, killing one child (Radio Transmission Technology [RTT] News, 2012). Then, on October 17, 2012, a grenade attack targeted officers from the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) who were cracking down on terrorist activity in the coastal city of Mombasa, killing one officer (Okumu, 2012).

Al-Shabaab terror group has taken responsibilities of involvement in the series of grenade attacks in Kenya in 2011-2012, the group clearly has support from extremists living in Kenya (Agence France-Presse, 2012). Indeed, the Muslim Youth Center, a Nairobi-based religious extremist group, celebrated some of the attacks on its Twitter account and warned, “Public warnings via social media are over like we said. May Allah keep the mujahedeen strong” (Anzalone, 2012).

Al-Shabaab terrorists executed further attacks in Kenyan territory like in Westgate mall in Nairobi in September 2013, in which 67 people were killed, Mpeketoni and Poromoko villages of Lamu County on June 16 and 17,where more than 60 people were butchered in cold blood, Mandera on 22 November 2014 in which 28 bus passengers were shot dead for not being able to recite the Koran, in Mundera again on Dec 2, 2014,where 36 quarry workers were killed and Garissa University College where 148 people were killed on 2 April, 2015.

Radicalisation

The Collins English Dictionary defines radicalisation as a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo, or reject and/or undermine contemporary ideas and expressions of freedom of choice (Collins English Dictionary, 2012). Radicalisation can be both violent and non-violent, meaning an individual or group may be radical without necessarily being engaged in violent extremism or terrorism. The convenient definition by most security agents is that radicalisation is the indoctrination of young people either Muslims or those who have converted to Islam by a radical Imam.

Many institutions in Western countries have undertaken research in recent years to understand the causes of radicalisation among the youth. In 2007, the New York Police Department published a report that concluded that ‘there is no single pathway to extremism, and that all cases take different paths of radicalisation’. They noted that ‘if an individual goes through all or even some of the steps of radicalisation that does not mean that they will commit an act of terrorism. Several cases exist where an individual radicalised (wholly or partially) and never committed any acts of terrorism’. In January 2012, The United Kingdom House of Commons Home Affairs Committee tabled a report titled ‘Roots of Violent Radicalisation’ in which it noted that mosques and religious institutions account for less than 2 per cent of the total cases of radicalisation in United Kingdom, noting that mosques are less ‘engaged in open radical preaching’ and that they were largely ‘disconnected from young at risk Muslims’ (Mohammed, 2011).

Internet, and universities and colleges were the major sources, with over 40 per cent of al Qaeda terrorist attacks in United Kingdom between 1999 and 2009 being conducted by individuals with university or college education. It says ‘the Home Office told us that violent radicalisation is increasingly taking place in private homes, particularly as the authorities clamp down on radicalisation in more public areas’. According to the report, the triggers for extremist violence include perceived or experienced discrimination, religious harassment, cultural conflict, social exclusion leading to feelings of alienation, and grievances. In a research by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations conducted in 2009, it was observed that radicalisation in Western nations was not generally driven by poverty or religious fanaticism, nor was it driven by political oppression (Ploch, 2010).

The institute noted that most of the villains were well educated, middle-class and well integrated individuals, driven by ‘perceived suffering of their brothers in the Islamic world’. Perhaps this informed the recent assertion by John Prescott, the former United Kingdom Deputy Prime Minister that Tony Blair’s invasion of Iraq largely contributed to the radicalisation of British Muslim youth (Horgan, 2012).

He observed that every time people watch Television and see ‘rockets firing on all these people, that’s what radicalises them’. There is growing understanding in recent years that religious ideology ‘gives coherence to individuals engaged in terrorism’ but is not necessarily the driver. John Hogan, Director of the International Centre for Study of Terrorism at Pennsylvania State University is more explicit in his comments that ‘the idea that radicalisation causes terrorism is perhaps the greatest myth alive today in terrorism research’. He says ‘overwhelming number of Muslims hold radical beliefs but are not violent’, arguing that there is growing evidence that people engaged in terrorism don’t necessarily hold radical views. Perhaps the government needs to critically examine drivers of radicalisation before planning counter measures (Neumann, 2013).

Drivers of Radicalisation

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) like Al-Shabaab terror group cannot sustain themselves without young recruits. Radical groups are astute observers of the challenges facing young people in Kenya, and they tailor their recruitment strategies to exploit youth vulnerabilities.
Individual Factors
Empirical studies indicate that radicalisation is fundamentally an individual process, young people, seek a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. They frequently convey a longing for adventure, glory, and heroic or iconic status, and search for outlets that enable them to break from convention. Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) are aware of young people’s quest for meaning and construct worldviews that satisfy youth desires for self-actualization and fulfillment (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Socioeconomic Factors
Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) like Al-Shabaab terror group take advantage of socioeconomic factors that render Kenyan youth vulnerable to radicalisation. Most Kenyan youth struggle to access employment, education, housing, health services, and other necessities. Achieving culturally recognized adulthood in Kenya is difficult for poor and non-elite youth, especially the young men among them. The prevalence of conflict, high rates of unemployment, lack of education, and especially the inability to establish a home and marry have all contributed to Kenyans remaining youths much longer than their counterparts elsewhere in the world. For instance, the United Nations define a youth as a person between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four, but Kenya defines a youth as a person between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five. During these decades of being categorized as a youth, young people experience long “in-between” periods, in which they sporadically pursue studies, work part-time, live at home with parents, or migrate to urban centers in search of economic opportunity (Crisis Group, 2011).

Young people caught in this “in-between” stage may become frustrated with their inability to achieve culturally recognized adulthood and seek validation by joining violent extremist groups, which give them an adult-like status through responsibility, purpose, and often financial compensation (Oruko, 2012).

Political factors
Young people are motivated by a desire to combat injustice, impunity, and corruption. When they observe any of these negative behaviors in public officials, especially corruption among security sector personnel, they become disillusioned with public institutions and look for solutions to problems outside of their countries’ political processes. The unequal or inconsistent application of the rule of law is a major driver of youth frustration. Impunity among politically connected elites causes young people to lose confidence in their legal institutions, especially when youth receive harsh punishments for seemingly small offenses (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011).

Politicians mobilize youth before elections in order to gain the youth vote. They commonly stoke youth frustrations and promise sweeping reforms aimed at improving their lives. After winning their elections, most of ignore or abandon youth supporters, leaving a semi-organized and politically charged youth cohort idle. Politicians who lose their elections may similarly exploit their youth followers by inciting them to violent protests or armed resistance. In both cases, political manipulation leads young people to feel disillusioned with politicians and electoral politics. This feeling may contribute to the conclusion that solutions to youth problems must be achieved outside of mainstream politics, perhaps through violent extremism (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Religious factors
Wahhabi influence in Kenya
Many young Muslims in Kenya have been indoctrinated into the belief that the wars in Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel-Palestine conflict are part of a broader global campaign against Islam as a religion. By promoting the “Umma ideology” the universal Muslim brotherhood, the Hanbali school started to oppose the Shafi’s school in Kenya, resulting in local youths starting to regard the situations in Somalia, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine as problems affecting all Muslims across the world and therefore, worthy of their involvement. This ideology, which preaches universal Muslim brotherhood, has led young people from Kenya and other parts of the world being recruited as mujahideen to fight in Somalia, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan against what is mainly perceived as United States of America and her allies interests. This factors combine to provide fertile ground for Muslim youths in Kenya to become radicalised and join extremist groups like Al-Shabaab (Navanti Group, 2013).

External Influences fueling Radicalisation in Kenya
The Internet
The 21st century communications technology remains one of the critical tools of radical Islam propaganda. The internet has become the primary radicalisation recruitment medium. Somalia’s success in communications technology has fostered the propulsion and utilization of violent radicalization. More than 5 prominent militant Islamic extremist sites exclusively run by Somali Jihadists exist today (Crisis Group, 2011).

Global Jihad
The global Jihad as reported world wide through Satellite TV had created the opportunity for the Kenyan extremists to be influenced. The war in Somalia, Iraq and the Israeli- Palestinian and calls for Jihad in Kenya does impact in promoting radical Islam in the Country (Navanti Group, 2013).

Somali Remittances, Islamic Financial Institutions
Most of the Somali remittance companies, although legitimate and the only reliable way of delivering seriously needed financial remittances services also remain the only natural financial conduits of the extremists as well. It is very difficult to decipher the financial flows that may end up in the hands of the extremists (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Flaws in anti-Jihad
Extensive mistakes have been made in the past in countering extremism in Kenya. This has resulted in massive
Kenyan of Somalia origin casualties. The Kenyan government reactive response against the extremism does result in significant civilian losses which influences the population to turn towards radicalisation and support for the extremist elements (Crisis Group, 2011).

Global Power & Interest
As global resource competition grows, Kenya has significant natural resources of interest. This in turn has attracted powerful nations and thus creates defensive attitudes amongst the indigenous communities who feel their resources are the target and they are punished for being the native owners of these resources. This has become a counter-productive measure against combating extremism and the spread of radical Islam among the Muslim natives of Kenya. In Counties like Garissa, Wajir, Mandera in former North Eastern province and counties as Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River and Lamu in former Coast province inhabitants have the feeling that their own government (Kenya) is against them (Crisis Group, 2011).

International Aid: Dependency Trends in Radicalisation
Many religious extremists believe that international aid is a deliberate effort to keep Kenyan people dependant on external aid while the region has abundant natural resources that can be tapped into to support the inhabitants. This has created negative notions and rejection of the claims of the Kenya governments’ non-stop call for food aid and other pleas. For many, it is a humiliation that they believe can be eliminated by way of adhering to Muslim fundamentalism by refusing to receive aid from non-Muslim nations (Navanti Group, 2013).

Foreign Failures to tap into Indigenous Talent
Many of educated and competent natives of the Kenya nationals are refused opportunities to be recruited into the process of national development and positions of power and influence in the international arena. This has discouraged many able and professional Kenyan natives to return and work. A trend which would have had serious impact in reducing radicalisation process as these professionals would have had opportunity to interact with the local population and eliminate the deficiencies which lead to radicalisation (Crisis Group, 2011).

Islamist extremist movements are known to use the following issues to enhance their foothold:

- Poverty and unemployment
- The growing gulf between the rich and the poor
- Inadequate government services
- Political corruption
- Perceived government subservience to United States of America demands, which leads to anti-American sentiments and anti-western emotions.

Radicalisation in Kenya
Kenya is facing a great challenge in dealing with the "enemy within”, who has executed several terror attacks undetected as Kenya Defense Forces and its allies effectively fight external aggressors Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

According to 2009 census, Kenya is home to approximately 4.3 million Muslims of the Country’s 38.6 million population, or about 9-10% of the Country’s population, and they predominately live in the former North Eastern and Coast provinces (International Crisis Group, 2012). Many Muslims in Kenya also live in the Eastleigh in Nairobi County. Eastleigh, often called “Little Mogadishu,” is mostly home to Somali refugees who, over the years, have fled the violence and instability in their home country (Ofeibea Quist-Arcton, 2011).

Certain territories in Kenya are susceptible to extremist or separatist ideology. Since Kenya’s independence in 1963, it has faced a number of secessionist challenges. From 1963 to 1968, ethnic Somalis in former North Eastern province attempted to secede and become part of “Greater Somalia” in the Shifta War (Ringquist, 2011). The war, as well as subsequent violence such as the Wagalla Massacre in 1984, was brutally suppressed, creating resentment among Somalis living in Kenya. After the Shifta War, the Kenyan government declared a state of emergency in former North Eastern Province that lasted for almost three decades, further alienating Somalis living in Kenya.

As a product of these repeated conflicts, former Northeastern and parts of Coast Provinces had a few basic services such as tarmacked roads, schools and hospitals in comparison to other parts of the County like former Central province. These regions suffer from high poverty level, high youth unemployment, rapid population growth and general insecurity. Resentment toward the government is high, and extremists are able to exploit these factors; chronic youth unemployment, for example, makes Al-Shabaab’s promise of limited income attractive (The Standard, 2011).

In the 1970s, Saudi Arabia-funded missionaries who travelled to Kenya to proselytize and convert Kenyan Muslims to Salafism. As a result of these missionary activities, the International Crisis Group argued that “the (Muslim) community in Kenya grew more insular, puritanical and conservative; sectarian animosities escalated, and traditional support for moderation and coexistence waned” (Odula, 2011).

In the 1990s, Muslims in Kenya were exposed to religious radicalism from Al-Qaeda, as well as from the Somali militant group Al-Ithihad Al-Islami (AlI). AlI’s goal was to establish an Islamic government in Somalia and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. It attempted to recruit Kenyan Somali youth in Garissa, Mandera and Nairobi Counties in Eastleigh in (Mohammed, 2011). It also raised funds through mosques to support its activities in Somalia. In 1996, Ethiopia launched a series of cross-border raids against AlI, basically defeating the group yet AlI’s leaders, Shaykh Hassan Dahir Aweys and Hassan Turki, would later play key leadership roles in the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and Al-Shabaab (Ghazzali, 2011). Parts of AlI’s former support network is likely now supporting Al-Shabaab, as well as domestic jihadists in Kenya.

The emergence of Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and then Al-Shabaab in 2006 contributed to radicalisation in Kenya. Although it was not until 2011 that Kenya began to suffer frequent small-scale terrorist attacks related to developments in
Somalia, Al-Shabaab has been building a formidable and secretive support network in the country since 2007 (Oruko, 2012).

Pumwani Riyadh Mosque

Today, there are a number of extremist support facilities in troubled areas of Kenya. Al-Shabaab’s primary source of support in Kenya appears to revolve around the Pumwani Riyadh Mosque, located near Eastleigh in Nairobi. Until recently, individuals at the mosque handed out jihadist pamphlets and articles authored by the late Anwar al-`Awlaqi, the Yemeni-American member of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who was killed by a U.S. drone in September 2011(Bahadur and M.H.D, 2012). The cleric’s speeches were translated into Kiswahili and other local languages, as well as Luganda, a widely spoken language in Uganda (Rohan, 2013). Clerics at the mosque also reportedly delivered sermons with religiously inflammatory content (Ibid).

In the clearest case of domestic radicalisation, the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) was formed at the Pumwani Riyadh Mosque in 2008 (Odhiambo, 2014). The MYC, also known as the Pumwani Muslim Youth, was established by Shaykh Ahmad Iman Ali purportedly to express the grievances of impoverished Muslim youth (Navanti Group, 2013). “In practice, however, the MYC has recruited hundreds of Muslims in Kenya to fight with Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Ibid). It has promised to sustain attacks for the “Al-Shabaab brothers” until Kenya withdraws troops from Somalia (Bosire, 2012).

Before evidence emerged of the MYC’s role in radicalisation and militancy, Ahmad Iman Ali was a respected shaykh in Nairobi. He was secretary for the mosque’s planning committee, where he handled construction at the mosque complex (Gisesa, 2012). Ahmad Iman Ali was also raising money and finding recruits for Al-Shabaab’s fight in Somalia (Ibid). In 2009, Ahmad Iman Ali overtly entered militancy and moved to Somalia, where he would become the leader of Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan recruits (Momayi, 2011).

Since Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia, authorities and analysts suspect that militant MYC members are responsible for much of the violence at home. In 2011, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia cited in its report that the MYC is spearheading recruitment, fundraising, training and support of jihad in Kenya (Odhiambo et al, 2013). Since at least 2010, Ahmad Iman Ali has called for jihad in Kenya, instructing MYC fighters in Somalia to “hit back and cause blasts in Kenya similar to the Kampala bombings” (Ibid). His mention of the Kampala bombings refers to Al-Shabaab’s suicide attacks targeting civilians watching the World Cup in the Ugandan capital in July 2010. That attack killed 74 people.

Jihadist speeches and literature as well as the activities of the MYC at the Pumwani Riyadh Mosque have contributed to the formation of a radicalised, secretive group of Kenyan jihadists in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Mandera and other cities (Mayabi, 2011). This Kenya-based group looks to Al-Shabaab as a source of emulation, while supporting its jihad by sending money and recruits to Somalia as well as attacking civilian targets in Kenya (Ibid). According to Kenyan former Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere, hundreds of Kenyan youth who trained with Al-Shabaab in Somalia have returned home to Kenya (Mayabi, 2011).

It is confirmed by analysts that recruitment now not only includes the Somali community in Kenya but also other Kenyans from other communities most of them from upcountry Kenya and are recent converts to Islam, like; Eligiva Oliacha Bwire alias Mohammed Seif, 28-year-old who hurled grenades at a crowded bus park on March 10, 2012 in Nairobi confessed he was a member of the Al-Shabaab group. Most of them are from upcountry Kenya and are recent converts to Islam, Nderitu aka Mohammed and Muchiri, alias Hussein. Paul Wangaga and his wife were shot dead after they threw three grenades at officers who wanted to arrest them,” On July 21, 2012 police in Kitale arrested two terror suspects, Abraham Kemoi Setot and Caleb Anyela Onyango,who were on a mission to allegedly bomb the Umoja Catholic Church, a busy parish in the Eastlands area of Nairobi (Cable News Network {CNN}, 2012).

According to the International Crisis Group, “There is growing evidence to suggest that attacks in former North Eastern Province are joint operations of Kenyan Swahili and Somali jihadis. Swahili members are easily able to evade security by posing as locals and counting on outdated profiling by Kenyan security officers that all Al-Shabaab members are Somali-looking” (Odhiambo, 2014).

In recent months, due to increased government oversight, these mosques are reportedly no longer delivering extremist rhetoric (Ibid). The International Crisis Group, however, conducted interviews in the area in 2012 and found that jihadist radicalisation “may have gone underground,” possibly to people’s homes or in madrasas.

Countering Radicalisation

Kenya’s ability to craft effective long-term counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies is dependent on the degree to which it is able to better understand the phenomenon of radicalisation. There is a tendency to confl ate radicalisation and terrorism. There is a link, but counter-terrorism tactics should not be the only official response to radicalisation. Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation are long-term processes needing tact and patience. Radicalisation will be a problem long after the physical threat of terrorism subsides. Islamist radicalisation is at the heart of the contest to shape the future of Islam and Muslim societies. The struggle against it will only be won if ingratiated approach is adopted by state and non statist actors. Since most radicalised Muslims detest United States of America and her allies, their involvement in Countering Radicalisation in Kenya would be counterproductive. There is room for donors to encourage moderation, but it must be done discreetly and in partnership with Muslim organisations that have wide support.

A. Madrasas

Kenya’s madrasas have been dominated by well-resourced Wahhabi charities and foundations since the late 1970s. Primary (idadi) and secondary (thanawi) level madrasas, teaching Arabic and the Wahhabi creed, have existed in all major urban centres for decades. Some operated relatively good health facilities or served as orphanages and feeding centres, improving impoverished Muslim communities in former North Eastern and Coast Provinces. Some also taught vocational skills such as tailoring and carpentry. But the primary aim was to proselytise; they absorbed thousands of students from
poor families who had dropped out of the mainstream.

State-run schools, the brighter of whom were often sent to elite Wahhabi institution of higher learning, Al-Falah Islamic Centre in Isiolo or Kisauni Islamic Centre in Mombasa. Many of their graduates went on to Saudi or Pakistani Islamic Universities to be trained as imams and preachers. For many young and ambitious Muslims in former North Eastern and Coast Provinces, this was the only route to gainful jobs and respectability.

Many of these madrasas are now cash-strapped, largely because of the crackdown on Muslim charities since the late 1990s. Enrolments have declined and scholarships have dried up. However, the overwhelming majority of the youths attending state-run or private primary and secondary schools also attend madrasas, especially in the former North Eastern Province. This dual system is a considerable burden for students and a factor in the disproportionate high school dropout rate. Further, many madrasas in former North Eastern Province and Eastleigh in Nairobi teach a variety of Salafi theologies that, in general, foster social conservatism, cultural relativism and separatism, at odds with values taught in mainstream schools (Crisis Group, 2010). Subjecting young impressionable students to these contradictory values contributes to youth maladjustment and alienation often exploited by jihadi radicals.

B. Madrasa Reform

Reform-minded Kenyan Somalis believe the madrasa system needs to be modified, (Crisis Group, 2011) but there is insufficient will to draft a strategy. The issue is deeply divisive. Realistically, madrasa reform can only be part of wider reform. Conservative groups and hardliners dismiss the idea as primarily driven by the West. It would be unwise for the state and donors to intervene. Modest and discreet attempts by the U.S. in recent years to encourage debate (especially in former Coast Province) have galvanised hardliners (Ibid). Competent, respected Muslim scholars should be encouraged to prepare an action plan, drawing on experiences throughout the Muslim world. Even a Muslim-led plan may not be readily acceptable because of sectarian and ideological divisions, but failure to reform would strengthen the case of those who want to scrap the whole system (Omar and Sarah, 2011).

There is no evidence of an appetite for comprehensive madrasa reform in Kenya. Many remain ambivalent or disinclined to the idea of reform, while a tiny but vocal constituency is implacably hostile. This aversion is mostly due to the religious and socio-cultural dominance of Wahhabism and other Salafi theologies and ill-advised state counter-terrorism policies that focus largely on security and heavy-handed policing and alienate and radicalise the Muslim community (Abdisaid, 2008). Salafi groups oppose reform because they fear it could highlight troubling aspects of their theology. Moderates and moderates prefer inaction because they consider the issue either not a great priority or to be inexpedient, since they could lose ground to the hardliners (Otto, 2010).

There is no model of a successful madrasa reform program to serve as a template, though lessons could be drawn from the modestly encouraging steps toward reform in a few countries, especially in South East Asia. These might include bringing private madrasa under the education ministry; requiring registration and enrolment information; setting academic standards that can be checked; and instituting a module of non-religious courses and government help that would also justify supervisory visits. But any reform plan must balance Muslim integration and the community’s right to live its faith. Reform will also entail a substantial overhaul of madrasa curriculum and a qualitative improvement in teaching, ideally by creating local teacher training colleges and universities. This requires technical interventions to progressively transform to the system (Koross, 2012). More important, it is about modernising and integrating traditional madrasa pedagogy with mainstream secular schooling. Many other faith communities in Kenya have already done this (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

C. Leadership

The challenges faced by the Muslim community like sectarian and inability to confront radicalisation; and mounting tensions with other major faith groups, are blamed on the lack of Kenyan-Muslim leadership. There is great disaffection with the “official” Muslim leaders, many of whom are widely viewed as elitist and self-serving; their integrity sullied through ties with the regime or foreign interests; and disconnected from harsh community realities (Mohamud, 2010).

This trust and credibility deficit compounds the leadership crisis and undermines community cohesion. Radical organisations have emerged in the last decade to challenge the “official” leadership and institutions (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Their political activism and radical anti-establishment politics are attractive to many youths, disillusioned with what they see as timid, pragmatist and moderate political views and style of the established institutions.

The institutions whose ageing leadership is at the centre of this backlash is the Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), whose status as the pre-eminent Kenyan-Muslim body is increasingly contested. Its traditional strategy of cultivating close links with regimes and the major political parties, as well as its preference for dialogue and engagement, may have been understandable and useful in the past but is now part of the crisis of confidence. Its officials personally profited from those relationships. During the former president Moi era, many were stalwarts of the ruling party and campaigned for it (Crisis Group, 2011). In return, they received Moi’s patronage. That culture has not changed. Many now support Party of National Unity (TNA). Yet while it has close ties to power, SUPKEM has not been effective in modifying the heavy-handed security tactics and petty discrimination faced by Muslims.

There are also allegations of corruption and nepotism. Critics complain of poor financial records and an inability to account for large grants from Gulf benefactors (Ibid). Some also suggest the long-standing scholarship program, funded through a grant scheme of the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), has not been well managed or has often been awarded in a nepotic fashion (Ploch. 2010). SUPKEM remains useful to the state, primarily for channelling grievances in a non-confrontational, pragmatic and moderate manner. It appears, however, that the authorities suspect the body’s diminished influence and role are beyond repair.

D. Chief Kadhi’s office

The Office of the Chief Kadhi has existed since colonial times, when, as an arm of the official judiciary, it was part of the hybrid judicial system designed to accommodate customary and religious legal systems. Its primary role was to
oversee kadhi courts across the country and enforce a limited Sharia regime, mainly in family and civil law. This modest concession to Sharia became the subject of a major controversy. A vigorous campaign in 2010 by churches to prevent the “entrenchment” of the kadhi courts in the new constitution raised Muslim-Christian tensions to unprecedented levels. But the then main political parties keen to gain Muslim votes resisted the pressure. However, while the issue is legally settled, there is no political closure. Many Christian groups feel aggrieved. Inter-faith relations are frayed, and the fissures opened by the ill tempered contest have widened. With inter-faith tensions likely to worsen due to the growing fear of jihadi terrorism, the potential for violence is real.

The Muslim community feels it scored a major political victory over the status of the kadhi courts. Many appreciate the role of key leaders in the coalition, especially the former President and Prime Minister Kibaki and Raila. There is renewed self-confidence and less hostile views of the central government. The regime has thus defused some of the old anger and indirectly undermined the radicalisation agenda. Yet, expectations also have been raised. The communities would like to extract more concessions, but calls for these would certainly renew tensions (Presthold, 2011).

Unless steps are taken to address the serious radicalisation problem, it will worsen. The biggest obstacle is the inability to muster the necessary resolve. The tendency within the Muslim community has often been to down-play the scale of the crisis or deny it exists. Unless it is acknowledged and a coherent, coordinated strategy drawn up, little will change. Progress ultimately depends on the will to act decisively, which may appear remote given the leadership problems. However, there are steps that could be taken to reform Islamic institutions and improve quality of leadership. These could include forming a Muslim Advisory Council of respected leaders, chosen by the community, to create a forum responsive to Muslim concerns and aspirations and able to articulate the community’s message to those in power and formulate the measures needed to improve its overall well-being.

Conclusion

After the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks in Kenya in 1998 and 2002, the government improved its ability to fight terrorism and related threats (Odhihambo, 2014). It increased its capabilities to identify, arrest and detain suspects through an Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) that was established in 2002. Yet Al-Shabaab’s advances in Somalia during the last few years have challenged Kenya’s ability to prevent terrorist attacks at home. Kenya’s border with Somalia is long and cannot be secured effectively, and it is easy to smuggle across weapons or men. Moreover, Al-Shabaab can rely on radicalised Muslims in Kenya to support its fight in Somalia, and put pressure on the Kenyan government by attacking civilian and soft targets in Kenya.

As Al-Shabaab continues to weaken in Somalia, the Kenyan government must also focus on finding suitable approaches to deradicalise the small number of Muslims who have been lured into extremism and are waging jihad in Kenya. The formation and activities of groups such as the MYC show that certain segments of Kenya’s Muslim population are at risk of radicalisation and recruitment into extremist groups. Even if Al-Shabaab is defeated in Somalia, Kenya’s role in that defeat has now made it a target for Islamist militants seeking revenge.

Recommendations

Radicalisation in Kenya is a multifaceted and complex challenge:
A. The need to make strategic investments in youth-oriented services, foremost among them education. Education services that provide young people with the skills needed to enter an increasingly modern and globally connected marketplace are vital. In a similar vein, vocational training is important to providing the Kenyan’s youth with employable skills, and it should be extended equally to young men and women. Education presents young people with a variety of life options and is a critical first line of defense against many of the socioeconomic factors that may lead to youth radicalization.

B. To strategically invest in young people to encourage their business activities. National and County governments to award start-up business capital to young entrepreneurs. The governments to work with financial institutions to increase the flow of capital to young businesspeople, perhaps by subsidizing or underwriting loans to young entrepreneurs.

C. The National and County governments to properly invest in youth oriented agencies, especially youth ministries. They highlighted the need to integrate youth perspectives into government by hiring young civil servants and creating recurring youth forums to listen to young people’s concerns.

D. Civil society groups, such as religious organizations, community associations, recreational clubs, sports teams, and others, serve as a primary line of defense against radical ideologies. They are capable of interacting with individual young people in ways that public institutions cannot. For this reason, governments and external donors should support mentoring programs carried out by civil society groups.

E. Achieving culturally recognized adulthood is challenging because it requires young people to have a steady income, to establish a home, and to marry. If the concept of adulthood remains static, radical groups may exploit it by offering young people adult-like status through positions of responsibility, purpose, and financial compensation.

F. To observe and engage youth culture, which reflects young people’s aspirations and frustrations. Youth culture can serve as a useful indicator of young people’s vulnerability to radicalization, and it offers opportunities for peer role models to disseminate counter-narratives.

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